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A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities

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Listed:
  • Barbara Norrander
  • Bernard Grofman

Abstract

Weisberg and Grofman (1981) propose a rational choice model of voter turnout which they test with data from the 1976 Presidential election. We extend and generalize that model to cover a wide variety of forms of electoral participation including working on a campaign, wearing campaign buttons, and talking to others about the campaign. We find that voters who see a difference between the candidates, with one candidate positively evaluated and the other negatively, are roughly twice as likely to participate in high involvement electoral activities as are those who are alienated from or indifferent to the candidates. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Norrander & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 187-192, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:57:y:1988:i:2:p:187-192
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00052406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernard Grofman, 1983. "Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 55-61, January.
    2. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1969. "Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-106, September.
    3. Garvey, Gerald, 1966. "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 29-38, March.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    5. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    6. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    7. Melvin Hinich, 1978. "Some evidence on non-voting models in the spatial theory of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 83-102, September.
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