Rent-seeking with non-identical players
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00052255
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References listed on IDEAS
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986.
"Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 391-397, Springer.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1996. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Working Papers 1996_11, York University, Department of Economics.
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Citations
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- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986.
"Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 391-397, Springer.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1996. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Working Papers 1996_11, York University, Department of Economics.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013.
"Who gains from information asymmetry?,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 305-337, September.
- Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013. "Who Gains from Information Asymmetry?," Working Papers 2013-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Schmidt, Frederik, 2007. "Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach," MPRA Paper 3289, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eric Sjöberg, 2014. "Settlement under the threat of conflict-The cost of asymmetric information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2014_02, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2013.
"Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking,"
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- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2013. "Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-5, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Frederik Schmidt, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of altruism and envy in Tullock contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 247-259, July.
- Fallucchi, Francesco & Ramalingam, Abhijit & Rockenbach, Bettina & Waligora, Marcin, 2021.
"Inequality and competitive effort: The roles of asymmetric resources, opportunity and outcomes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 81-96.
- FALLUCCHI Francesco & RAMALINGAM Abhijit, 2017. "Inequality and Competitive Effort: The Roles of Asymmetric Resources, Opportunity and Outcomes," LISER Working Paper Series 2017-12, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
- Francesco Fallucchi & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2018. "Inequality and Competitive Effort: The Roles of Asymmetric Resources, Opportunity and Outcomes," Working Papers 18-16, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
- Tim Friehe, 2011. "On being asset-constrained in litigation contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 277-284, June.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
- Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 499-510, March.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012.
"Emotions in litigation contests,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 195-215, September.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2011. "Emotions in Litigation Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3351, CESifo.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "Conflict and Rent-Seeking: Ratio Vs. Difference Models," UCLA Economics Working Papers 491, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi, 2009.
"Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 171-196, April.
- Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "Seeking Rents in the Shadow of Coase," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-069/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006.
"Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid,"
Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, May.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2005. "Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid," IZA Discussion Papers 1711, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2019. "Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989.
"Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262,
Springer.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Frederik Schmidt, 2008. "Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 189-208, September.
- Rajeev Goel & Daniel Rich, 1989. "On the economic incentives for taking bribes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 269-275, June.
- Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
- Morin Chassé, Rémi, 2019. "Strategic behavior in environmental contests with asymmetric ability and reimbursement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 115-126.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "A note on the timing of investments in litigation contests," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 313-326, June.
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- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
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