IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v60y1989i3p259-282.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Arthur Schram
  • Frans Winden

Abstract

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies. An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research is gratefully acknowledged. Previous drafts of this paper were presented at the following congresses: The European Consortium for Political Research (Amsterdam, 10–15 April 1987); the Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (Reggio Calabria, 22–25 April 1987), and the Econometric Society European Meeting (Copenhagen, 24–28 August 1987). The participants in these sessions, as well as the participants in the seminar of the Sociological Institute of the University of Milan are gratefully acknowledged for their useful suggestions. Special thanks are due to Nathaniel Beck and Friedrich Schneider for carefully reading the manuscript and presenting helpful comments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Schram & Frans Winden, 1989. "Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 259-282, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:60:y:1989:i:3:p:259-282
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00159397
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00159397
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00159397?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-1159, December.
    2. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 88(350), pages 243-253, June.
    3. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-183, May.
    4. Himmelweit, Hilde T. & Biberian, Marianne Jaeger & Stockdale, Janet, 1978. "Memory for Past Vote: Implications of a Study of Bias in Recall," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 365-375, July.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-296, June.
    6. Gibson, Betty Blecha, 1980. "Estimating Demand Elasticities for Public Goods from Survey Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1069-1076, December.
    7. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156, September.
    8. Kramer, Gerald H., 1983. "The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 92-111, March.
    9. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February.
    10. Courant, Paul N & Gramlich, Edward M & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1979. "Public Employee Market Power and the Level of Government Spending," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 806-817, December.
    11. Werner W. Pommerehne & Bruno S. Frey, 1976. "Two Approaches To Estimating Public Expenditures," Public Finance Review, , vol. 4(4), pages 395-407, October.
    12. Bert Jaarsma & Arthur Schram & Frans Winden, 1986. "On the voting participation of public bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 183-187, January.
    13. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1981. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1483-1536, December.
    14. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    15. Hockley, G. C. & Harbour, G., 1983. "Revealed preferences between public expenditures and taxation cuts: Public sector choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 387-399, December.
    16. Strauss, Robert P. & Hughes, G. David, 1976. "A new approach to the demand for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 191-204, October.
    17. Schram, Arthur & van Winden, Frans, 1986. "An economic model of party choice in a multiparty system: An empirical application to The Netherlands," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 465-497.
    18. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1982. "Economic Outcomes and Political Support for British Governments among Occupational Classes: A Dynamic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 259-279, June.
    19. James Ferris, 1983. "Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 135-154, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. François Facchini, 1993. "Paysage et économie : la mise en évidence d'une solution de marché," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 218(1), pages 12-18.
    2. David L. Ryan & Stuart Landon, 1998. "The Political Costs of Tax Reform: A Canadian Perspective," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 37-48.
    3. John Hudson & Philip Jones, 2005. "“Public goods”: An exercise in calibration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 267-282, September.
    4. Duparc-Portier, Geoffroy & Figus, Gioele, 2024. "How should governments respond to energy price crises? A horse-race between fiscal policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Judy A. Temple & Susan Porter‐Hudak, 1995. "Preferences For State Tax And Spending Policies: Evidence From Survey Data On The Role Of Income," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 43-58, March.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. van Dalen, Hendrik P & Swank, Otto H, 1996. "Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 183-200, October.
    4. Randall G. Holcombe, 2023. "The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 157-167, July.
    5. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 1996. "A Revelation Approach To Optimal Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(4), pages 439-463, October.
    6. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 47-60, July.
    7. Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2002. "The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: a survey of the empirical evidence," Chapters, in: Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Roy D. Adams & Ken McCormick, 1993. "The Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Needs to Be Expanded, Not Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 109-116, January.
    9. G. Tridimas*, 1985. "Budget Deficits and the Growth of Public Expenditure in South Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 53(4), pages 251-257, December.
    10. Rodney Fort, 1988. "The median voter, setters, and non-repeated construction bond issues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 213-231, March.
    11. Janet G. Stotsky, 1990. "The Effect of the Elimination of Sales Tax Deductibility on State Fiscal Decisions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 18(1), pages 25-46, January.
    12. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    13. Jorge M. Streb & Daniel Lema & Gustavo Torrens, 2009. "Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: Cross‐Country Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 426-447, August.
    14. Partha Gangopadhyay & Shyam Nath, 2001. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Local Expenditure," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 38(13), pages 2379-2391, December.
    15. Bergstrom, Pal & Dahlberg, Matz & Mork, Eva, 2004. "The effects of grants and wages on municipal labour demand," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 315-334, June.
    16. Kouvavas, Omiros, 2013. "Political Budget Cycles Revisited, the Case for Social Capital," MPRA Paper 57504, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2013.
    17. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
    18. Toke S. Aidt & Francisco José Veiga & Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2007. "Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: An Integrated Approach," NIPE Working Papers 24/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    19. Witterblad, Mikael, 2008. "Essays on Redistribution and Local Public Expenditures," Umeå Economic Studies 731, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    20. T. Tideman, 1983. "An experiment in the demand-revealing process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 387-401, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:60:y:1989:i:3:p:259-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.