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Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs

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  • Karol Sołltan

Abstract

This paper tries to help bridge the inductive and the deductive traditions in the study of democracy. I identify two empirical patterns, which I call the paradox of conflict and the paradox of decision importance. More conflict ridden societies are both less likely to be democracies, and, when democratic, more likely to be consensual rather than majoritarian. Similarly, important (revolutionary, regime-transforming) decisions are less likely to be democratic but, when democratic, they are more likely to be consensual. I use a decision-cost-minimizing model of democracy to explain those patterns. The model is developed out of the metaphor of institutions as decision producing firms, attempting to maximize quality and minimize cost of those decisions. Its main intellectual source is the transaction cost-minimizing view of organizations but the formalism owes most to Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Karol Sołltan, 1988. "Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 155-173, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:57:y:1988:i:2:p:155-173
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00052403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Herbert Kiesling, 1968. "Potential costs of alternative decision-making rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 49-58, March.
    2. Rae, Douglas W., 1975. "The Limits of Consensual Decision," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1270-1294, December.
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    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    6. Barton, David M, 1973. "Constitutional Choice and Simple Majority Rule: Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 471-479, Part I, M.
    7. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Optimal voting rules under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 149-165, January.
    8. Williamson, Oliver E, 1981. "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1537-1568, December.
    9. North, Douglass C & Wallis, John Joseph, 1982. "American Government Expenditures: A Historical Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 336-340, May.
    10. William M. Dugger, 1983. "The Transaction Cost Analysis of Oliver E. Williamson: A New Synthesis?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 95-114, March.
    11. Rae, Douglas W., 1969. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 40-56, March.
    12. Gordon Tullock, 1984. "A (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 89-99, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Özcan, Burcu & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2011. "Social trust and human development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 753-762.

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