The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00116759
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- Rode, David C. & Fischbeck, Paul S., 2019. "Regulated equity returns: A puzzle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
- Daniel R. Hollas & Stanley R. Stansell, 1991. "Regulation, Ownership Form, And The Economic Efficiency Of Rural Electric Distribution Cooperatives," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 201-220, Summer.
- Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2010.
"What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation,"
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- Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joseph A. Fields & Chinmoy Ghosh & Linda S. Klein, 1998. "From Competition To Regulation: The Six‐Year Battle To Regulate California'S Insurance Markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 1(2), pages 54-71, January.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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