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Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice

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  • Leonard Dudley
  • Claude Montmarquette

Abstract

This paper has attempted to explain variations among countries in the tax level, in the importance of progressive taxes and transfers, and in the after-tax share of middle-income groups. Particular attention was paid to the declines in each of these variables which are observable in cross-section data in the intermediate ranges of development. It was argued that these phenomena are difficult to explain by variations in the demand for public spending or in the degree of tax evasion. The hypothesis set out in this paper was that these nonlinearities are a result of the inability of elected representatives to observe taxable activities at certain levels of income. The result is a loss of potential tax revenues through bribes to officials. Such bribes, it was suggested, are most likely in the income brackets where total income is increasing rapidly in developing countries. A theoretical model based on expected vote maximization by political candidates indicated that voter-taxpayers will be unwilling to make up the short fall by additional taxes. To the extent that the problem of observing taxable activities is more serious for direct than for indirect taxes, direct tax revenues should fail to keep pace with total income in the early stages of development. The presence of supply-side constraints on the capacity of the fiscal system to generate direct-tax revenues was tested by means of a simultaneous-equation model. Since in practice transfer payments or negative taxes form an important part of the direct tax system, it was necessary to include them in the empirical analysis. It was decided to define an unobservable variable, the overall fiscal structure, which reflects the effects of both tax structure and transfer payments. Use of the LISREL technique allowed this new variable to be treated as a latent variable in statistical estimation. The results indicated that overall fiscal structure varied in nonlinear fashion with the logarithm of per-capita income, as the theoretical model predicted. This variable was found in turn to be a significant determinant of the level of taxes and the distribution of after-tax income. Little evidence was found of feedback from these other variables to the overall fiscal structure. These findings were interpreted as being consistent with the hypothesis that voter choices may be constrained by the revenue-generating capacity of the fiscal system if a significant portion of taxable activities is not easily observable. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette, 1987. "Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 127-160, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:55:y:1987:i:1:p:127-160
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00156814
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Marco Pani, 2009. "Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 2009/083, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof," MPRA Paper 17177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jean Cartier-Bresson, 1992. "Éléments d'analyse pour une économie de la corruption," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(131), pages 581-609.
    4. Ventelou, Bruno, 2001. "Équilibres et stabilité de la corruption dans un modèle de croissance : l’effet de la rémunération des politiciens," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(3), pages 339-356, septembre.
    5. Marco Pani, 2011. "Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 163-196, July.
    6. Lawrence Kenny & Stanley Winer, 2006. "Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(2), pages 181-215, May.
    7. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Informal Sector and Taxation," MPRA Paper 17129, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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