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Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government

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  • Charlotte Twight

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  • Charlotte Twight, 1988. "Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 131-152, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:56:y:1988:i:2:p:131-152
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00115753
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas McGuire, 1981. "Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 313-322, January.
    2. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-336, August.
    3. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    4. Cheung, Steven N S, 1974. "A Theory of Price Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 53-71, April.
    5. Higgs, Robert, 1985. "Crisis, bigger government, and ideological change: Two hypotheses on the ratchet phenomenon," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-28, January.
    6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    7. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    8. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
    9. E. West & Stanley Winer, 1980. "Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 607-622, January.
    10. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
    11. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    12. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    13. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    14. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    15. Mack Ott, 1981. "Bureaucratic Incentives, Social Efficiency, and the Conflict in Federal Land Policy," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 1(2), pages 585-607, Fall.
    16. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    17. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charlotte Twight, 1992. "Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 89-112, December.
    2. Steven Kan & Chun-Sin Hwang, 1996. "A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-219, September.
    3. Daniel Sutter, 1995. "Constitutional politics within the interest-group model," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 127-137, June.
    4. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    5. Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.
    6. Charlotte Twight, 1989. "Institutional Underpinnings of Parochialism: The Case of Military Base Closures," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(1), pages 73-105, Spring/Su.

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