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Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era

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  • Joseph Reid
  • Michael Kurth

Abstract

In part A. The patronage era we explain of the changing organization of public employees from patrons to spoilsmen. (Part B. Civil service and militancy, explains the evolution from spoilsmen to civil servants to militant unionists). Commonly, each transformation has been related only to some failing of its preceding form: patronage ended because of its corruption, civil service began because of its promise to stop corruption, and militancy spread because of the inadequacies of civil service. In contrast to these different explanations of each transformation of government employment, we offer the same explanation for each change: a public choice theory assumption that the new organizational form more efficiently maximized the mixture of votes, power, and income that politicians seek. Thus, when poor immigrants promised votes for insurance from urban hazards and businessmen promised graft in return for accommodations, spoilsmen effected the exchanges. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth, 1988. "Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 253-262, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:59:y:1988:i:3:p:253-262
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118539
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    4. Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth, 1989. "Public employees in political firms: Part B. Civil service and militancy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 41-54, January.
    5. James Q. Wilson, 1961. "The Economy of Patronage," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 369-369.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth, 1989. "Public employees in political firms: Part B. Civil service and militancy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 41-54, January.
    2. Michael M Ting & James M Snyder Jr & Shigeo Hirano & Olle Folke, 2013. "Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 363-387, July.
    3. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, 1993. "Doing Well While Intending Good: Cases in Political Exploitation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 317-348, July.

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