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Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination

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  • Al Wilhite

Abstract

Political parties can enhance their clout in Congress by adding to the seats under their control, or by increasing party loyalty. Interestingly, the latter option seems to play a very small role in the two elections studied. The Democratic Party altered their funding decisions based on loyalty during the 1980 election cycle, but not in 1982. Republicans did not base party contributions on party loyalty in either election, although there is less reason to expect them to do so because of their minority status. On the other hand, both parties reacted to the possibility of additional seats by funneling funds into close races. Aggregate party contributions (Table 1) and the party specific models (Table 2) consistently suggest that money flows into these volatile races. The results also suggest parties discriminate. In both election years, the Republican party contributed less money to black candidates (a differential of more than $3000) than their non-black counterparts. This racial differentiation existed even though electability and unity characteristics were taken into account. Sexual discrimination is even more pronounced. While the aggregate party contributions model shows a $1500 advantage for female candidates in 1982, more interesting conclusions arise from the party specific models. The Democratic party discriminated against women in 1980, but the absolute amounts of money were small. The Republican party results displayed substantial pro-female contributions in both elections under consideration. From the perspective of financial party support, it appears that women have greater resources in the Republican party. Interestingly, these race and sex results mirror earlier measures pertaining to other categories of contributions. Burrel (1985) finds no evidence of anti-female behavior by contributors and suggests that there may even be some pro-female bias in total finances. Similarly, Wilhite and Theilmann (1986) find evidence that PACs discriminate against black candidates but not females. Finally, it should be remembered that there are other types of party support that may give them additional influence in the electoral process. Although this paper concentrates on financial resources, contributions and other types of support often go hand in hand. To the extent that this is true, funds become a proxy for a greater tradeoff made by politicians and parties and these results may illuminate important factors in that exchange. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Al Wilhite, 1988. "Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 259-268, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:58:y:1988:i:3:p:259-268
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00155671
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. W. Welch, 1980. "The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 97-120, January.
    2. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
    3. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
    4. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 772-791, September.
    5. Shingles, Richard D., 1981. "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 76-91, March.
    6. W. Welch, 1981. "Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 209-234, January.
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