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Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill

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  • Donald Saari
  • Jill Newenhizen

Abstract

Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill (1988) contend that the indeterminacy of approval voting (AV), introduced in our paper (1988), is not a vice, but a surpassing virtue of AV. They do not compare the negative versus the positive features of AV, so their assertion remains a conjecture. Our response emphasizes the need to determine the costs of AV and to evaluate them against any merits. Moreover, by correcting and answering BFM's comments, the argument against AV becomes much stronger. This is because we show that AV's region of indeterminacy is quite large; it includes most profiles. Some of the consequences of this instability are that the AV outcome can negate the voter's true wishes, that the AV outcome can be volatile even to minor fluctuations of voter's decisions, and that AV is one of the most susceptible systems to manipulation by small groups of voters (for example, small, maverick groups could determine the AV outcome). Under specific circumstances, AV may be appropriate. To identify these situations we propose the more accurate name of the "Unsophisticated Voter System." Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 133-147, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:59:y:1988:i:2:p:133-147
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00054449
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saari, Donald G., 1987. "The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
    3. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
    4. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill, 1988. "The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-131, November.
    5. Niemi, Richard G., 1984. "The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 952-958, December.
    6. Donald G. Saari, 1985. "The Optimal Ranking Method is the Borda Count," Discussion Papers 638, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
    3. Alexander Tabarrok & Lee Spector, 1999. "Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 261-288, April.
    4. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.

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