Theory of competitive regulatory equilibrium
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119449
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- Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
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"Theories of Economic Regulation,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
- Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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- John C. Goodman & Philip K. Porter, 2021. "Will quadratic voting produce optimal public policy?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 141-148, January.
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