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Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models

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  • Henry Chappell

Abstract

A variety of single equation and simultaneous equation models have been employed to test the hypothesis that interest group campaign contributions influence congressional voting. Although contributions exhibited the anticipated positive effect in all models, the simultaneous equations estimates generally indicated much lower significance levels for the contribution coefficients than did the single equation models. The lower significance levels are apparently attributable to a lack of precision of the simultaneous model estimates (indicated by large standard errors) as well as possible bias of the single equation models. It was also found that qualitative results from the more sophisticated simultaneous probit-Tobit models were quite similar to those obtained from 2SLS estimation of the linear probability model. The overall results of the study are unavoidably ambiguous. Contributions did not show highly significant effects in the preferred simultaneous models, but the consistent sign pattern suggests that it would be inappropriate to conclude that contributions have no effects. Study of additional issues and interest groups may help to resolve some of ambiguity surrounding the contribution-voting relationship. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

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  • Henry Chappell, 1981. "Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 301-312, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:2:p:301-312
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123786
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Silberman, Jonathan I & Durden, Garey C, 1976. "Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 317-329, April.
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    4. Johnson, Thomas, 1972. "Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables in Economic Relationships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 455-462, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, 2004. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, January.
    2. Kevin Grier, 1989. "Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 201-219, December.
    3. Riddel, Mary, 2003. "Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 177-194, March.
    4. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    5. Dana L. Hoag & Thomas G. Field, 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-407.
    6. Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler, 1993. "Union Influence and Right‐to‐Work Law Passage," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 183-192, April.
    7. Russell, Levi, 2018. "Ideology, Electoral Incentives, PAC Contributions, and the Agricultural Act of 2014," Working Papers 06978, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    8. Russell, Levi A., 2018. "Ideology, Electoral Incentives, PAC Contributions, and the Agricultural Act of 2014," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 43(2), May.
    9. Philip Hersch & Gerald McDougall, 1988. "Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 127-139, May.
    10. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-373, October.
    11. Keith Poole & Thomas Romer, 1985. "Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 63-111, January.
    12. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    13. Henry Chappell, 1981. "Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 331-335, January.
    14. Joseph P. McGarrity & Daniel Sutter, 2000. "A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(1), pages 41-63, July.
    15. Daniel E. Bergan, 2010. "Estimating the Effect of Tobacco Contributions on Legislative Behavior Using Panel Data," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(3), pages 635-648, September.
    16. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    17. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-350, October.

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