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A note on the determinants of AFDC policies

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  • Richard Cebula

Abstract

The above results may be interpreted, as follows: political pressure to raise welfare (AFDC) levels is greater in those states where the population actually receiving welfare (AFDC) is greater and where unemployment among adult non-welfare recipients (who may expect to become welfare-eligible) is greater. If higher welfare (AFDC) levels act to attract an influx of additional welfare-eligible voters, these additional voters may align with the voter pools described in Section 2 to raise AFDC levels even further. The end result could be a pattern of ever-growing geographical AFDC differentials. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cebula, 1981. "A note on the determinants of AFDC policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 327-330, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:2:p:327-330
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00138251
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Cebula, 1976. "A note on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 117-119, December.
    2. Orr, Larry L, 1976. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 359-371, June.
    3. Cebula, Richard, 1978. "The Determinants of Human Migration," MPRA Paper 58401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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