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Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government

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  • Lawrence Bezeau

Abstract

Complexity of policies is shown to confer differential benefits on those people who have the time necessary to understand the policies. Understanding is defined to mean the ability to predict the consequences of implementation. Breton's economic theory of representative government postulates three groups in society: politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens, with the first two groups forming government bureaucracies that have policies as their sole output. This paper shows that complexity of policies is preferred by bureaucrats, politicians, and citizens in that order because, as one goes down the list, individuals have less time to understand policies and more policies that affect them. Bureaucrats, in order to achieve a level of incomprehension in the other two groups that mazimizes bureaucratic power, must sometimes design policies that they cannot fully understand themselves. This leads to policies with unintended and unanticipated consequences. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v. 1979

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  • Lawrence Bezeau, 1979. "Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 493-498, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:3:p:493-498
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00225684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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