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The influence of state-level economic conditions on presidential elections

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  • Burton Abrams

Abstract

Evidence from recent presidential elections indicates that voters behave as if they hold presidents accountable for changes in state-level economic conditions. Given the apparent political payoffs, it is almost a certainty that macroeconomic pump-priming (which affects state-level conditions on average) and certain inter-state redistributive policies would engender support from pragmatic incumbent presidents. The finding that state-level economic conditions can affect voting behavior is particularly relevant to the president already caught in an over-heated macroeconomic environment; for example, because of the peculiarities of the electoral college, Carter might improve his chances for re-election in 1980 by cutting some federal programs in Arizona and Nebraska (strong Ford states) and switching them to Illinois or Texas (closely contested states in 1976). Abolishing the electoral college and permitting popular votes to determine presidential-election outcomes would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the president's political gains from such state-level redistributive policies. This study's findings also suggest a potentially perverse side-effect from the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) as amended in 1974. By legislatively equalizing the major-parties' presidential campaign spending, FECA has removed the natural fund-raising advantage of the incumbent president — especially Republican incumbent presidents. Removing this advantage could well increase the relative importance of other vote-getting activities — for example, the manipulation of national and state-level economic conditions. The findings for the 1972 election suggest that state-level campaign spending influences state-level voting outcomes. Since FECA has lowered major-party presidential campaign spending — which presumably has had the effect of raising the marginal productivity of campaign spending — the allocation of spending across states may be more important than ever in deciding presidential-election outcomes. Finally, the finding that state-level economic conditions affect voting outcomes raises the possibility that earlier studies which have found voter responses to national-level conditions may actually only be measuring the influence of state-level conditions (on average). Determining to what extent voters respond to national-level economic conditions after controlling for state-level conditions must await further analysis. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Suggested Citation

  • Burton Abrams, 1980. "The influence of state-level economic conditions on presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 623-631, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:5:p:623-631
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00140090
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
    2. Frey, Bruno S., 1978. "Politico-economic models and cycles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 203-220, April.
    3. Meltzer, Allan H & Vellrath, Marc, 1975. "The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 781-798, December.
    4. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Walker A. Pollard, 1983. "Presidential Elections: Cyclical and Distributional Economic Effects," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(2), pages 217-236, April.
    2. Antoine Auberger & Eric Dubois, 2005. "The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 363-383, December.
    3. Burton Abrams & Plamen Iossifov, 2006. "Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 249-262, December.
    4. Paul R. Blackley & Edward M. Shepard, 1994. "A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of State-Level Economic Conditions On the 1992 Presidential Election," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(3), pages 366-382, July.
    5. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00800638 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jordan, Jerry L. & Luther, William J., 2022. "Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 510-515.
    7. repec:rre:publsh:v:36:y:2006:i:3:p:427-47 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Fabio Milani, 2010. "Political Business Cycles In The New Keynesian Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(4), pages 896-915, October.
    9. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & A. K. M. Nurul Hossain & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2016. "Does the central bank contribute to the political monetary cycles in Bangladesh?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 365-394, November.
    10. Leo Kahane, 2009. "It’s the economy, and then some: modeling the presidential vote with state panel data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 343-356, June.

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