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Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems

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  • Samuel Merrill

Abstract

We have seen that under the assumptions of this study the problem of maximizing a voter's total utility for a number of one-stage decision rules for multi-candidate elections may be specified as linear (or quadratic) programs. Potentially optimal strategies emerge as extreme points of the feasible region in the sense that no other strategies can be uniquely optimal. Categorical, approval, Borda, and z-score decision rules are all minimal in the sense that for each, the feasible region (with abstentions excepted) consists entirely of potentially uniquely optimal strategies. For each of these decision rules we have determined the optimal strategies explicitly in terms of the voter's utility function. Among the minimal voting systems studies, we argue that the voter's task of estimating his optimal strategy is least difficult under approval voting. Application of optimal strategies to the results of a thermometer scale survey suggest that the approval, Borda, and z-score decision rules can produce results very similar to one another but very different from that of categorical voting. Furthermore, for this survey, the former three systems were far less sensitive than categorical voting to the withdrawal of some of the candidates. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1981

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Merrill, 1981. "Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 115-134, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:1:p:115-134
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00163774
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Joslyn, 1976. "The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-17, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lehtinen, Aki, 2008. "The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 688-704, September.
    2. Thomas A. Rietz, 1993. "Strategic Behavior in Multi-Alternative Elections: A Review of Some Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 1026, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Ilia Tsetlin, 2006. "A Method for Eliciting Utilities and its Application to Collective Choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 51-62, August.
    4. Samuel Merrill, 1985. "A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, January.

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