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Coalitions under demand revealing

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  • T. Tideman
  • Gordon Tullock

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • T. Tideman & Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Coalitions under demand revealing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 323-328, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:2:p:323-328
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123788
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-1159, December.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1977. "Demand-revealing process, coalitions, and public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 103-105, March.
    3. Riker, William H, 1979. "Is "a New and Superior Process" Really Superior?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 875-890, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Melville McMillan, 1983. "A further consideration of coalitions under the demand-revealing process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 227-230, January.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 2001. "Random thoughts on voting," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 266-273, September.
    3. Michael Munger, 2008. "Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 507-522, December.
    4. T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2015. "Remembering Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 235-238, March.
    5. Richard Wallick, 2012. "Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 223-244, July.

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