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Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures

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  • Joe Oppenheimer

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  • Joe Oppenheimer, 1979. "Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 419-434, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:3:p:419-434
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00225678
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schwartz, Thomas, 1977. "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 999-1010, September.
    2. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Winer, Mark D., 1978. "The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 599-615, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
    2. Joe Oppenheimer, 1981. "Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 133-140, January.

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