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The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures

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  • Raphael Gillett

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  • Raphael Gillett, 1980. "The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 483-491, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:4:p:483-491
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00128125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gillett, Raphael, 1978. "A recursion relation for the probability of the paradox of voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 318-327, August.
    2. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    3. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1976. "The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 14-25, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lirong Xia, 2020. "How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?," Papers 2011.03791, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    2. Niclas Boehmer & Robert Bredereck & Piotr Faliszewski & Rolf Niedermeier, 2022. "A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Robustness of (Real-World) Election Winners," Papers 2208.13760, arXiv.org.

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