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Running off empty: Run-off point systems

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  • Jeffrey Richelson

Abstract

One form of the multistage election system is the run-off system, whereby an initial set of candidates is reduced by eliminating from consideration the lowest ranking alternatives at each stage of the process. This paper investigates three run-off systems: the plurality run-off, the Nanson system, and the Coombs system, with respect to five criteria including Partial Non-manipulability, the Uniform Majority Principle, Independence from Individual Orderings, Voter Adaptability, and Inverse Condorcet. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Richelson, 1980. "Running off empty: Run-off point systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 457-468, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:4:p:457-468
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00128123
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Campbell, Donald E., 1977. "Computational Criteria for Voting Systems," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 85-98, January.
    2. Chamberlin, John R. & Cohen, Michael D., 1978. "Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1341-1356, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Bernard De Baets, 2017. "Recursive Monotonicity of the Scorix: Borda Meets Condorcet," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 793-813, July.
    2. Raúl Pérez-Fernández & José Luis García-Lapresta & Bernard De Baets, 2019. "Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: 2017 Rector Election at Ghent University," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-11, January.
    3. Eyal Baharad & Zvika Neeman, 2007. "Robustness against inefficient manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 55-67, July.
    4. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.
    5. Montes, Ignacio & Rademaker, Michael & Pérez-Fernández, Raúl & De Baets, Bernard, 2020. "A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 285(3), pages 977-987.

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