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Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies

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  • Bernard Grofman

Abstract

In re-analyzing the Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) examination of ‘rational’ abstention we found that admitting mixed strategies does not affect findings as to the optimal behavior of voters who are expected utility maximizers but does significantly affect our expectations as to behavior of voters using a minimax regret rule. We found that minimax regretters with admissible mixed strategies would always have some probability of voting rather than abstaining, except under the quite restrictive condition that c > 1/2. Thus, to the extent that some voters can be seen as operating from a minimax regret perspective, a decision to vote on their part can be understood without recourse to ideas like the ‘psychic benefits of voting’ or ‘citizen duty’. An important difference between the Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) analysis and our own is that their models all have step-function threshold effects, while ours is probabilistic in nature and behavior is gradient-like. In the usual rational choice modeling of voter behavior (including the minimax regret model restricted to the pure strategy case) voters behave deterministically: e.g. if p 3 + p 4 > 2c then expected utility maximizing voters always abstain in two-candidate plurality elections; if p 3 + p 4 > 2c then they always vote for their first choice. In the mixed strategy minimax regret model, on the other hand, raising c (or k) does not operate in a dichotomous fashion — instantaneously shifting the voter from voting to abstention once a critical threshold is passed. Rather, as c (or k) increases, the probability of voting decreases. We believe that probabilistic choice mechanisms are more descriptive of human choice behavior (including voter behavior) than are deterministic ones. Thus, while the mixed strategy minimax-regret model we propose may only account for the behavior of some voters, we believe it is desirable to pursue other models for voter choice which, unlike those now current in the literature, do not postulate sharp ‘on-off’ effects but make use instead of response-gradient notions. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff b.v 1979

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Grofman, 1979. "Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 189-200, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:2:p:189-200
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00129526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. Tollison & T. Willett, 1973. "Some simple economics of voting and not voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 59-71, September.
    2. Russell Settle & Buron Abrams, 1976. "The determinants of voter participation: A more general model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 81-89, September.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    4. Stephens, Stephen V., 1975. "The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 914-915, September.
    5. Mayer, Lawrence S. & Good, I. J., 1975. "Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 916-917, September.
    6. Ferejohn, John A. & Fiorina, Morris P., 1975. "Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 920-925, September.
    7. Ferejohn, John A. & Fiorina, Morris P., 1974. "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 525-536, June.
    8. Yoram Barzel & Eugene Silberberg, 1973. "Is the act of voting rational?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 51-58, September.
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    1. Donald Wittman, 1984. "Multi-candidate equilibria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 287-291, January.
    2. Bernard Grofman, 1983. "Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 55-61, January.

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