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The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism

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  • Roy Gardner

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of the Paretian liberal is cast as a preference revelation game whose outcome function satisfies Gibbard's libertarian condition and strong Pareto optimality. Strategic consistency requires that the equilibrium of the game agree with the sincere outcome. It is shown that, whether viewed in a cooperative or non-cooperative context, the liberal social choice function is strategically inconsistent. This result suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, a different resolution of the liberal paradox is desirable. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Gardner, 1980. "The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 241-252, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:2:p:241-252
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00140847
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Aldrich, 1977. "The dilemma of a paretian liberal: Some consequences of Sen's theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, June.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
    3. Kelly, Jerry S., 1976. "Rights exercising and a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 138-153, August.
    4. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy Gardner, 1983. "Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 237-247, January.

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