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Stable constitutions

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  • Jeong, Daeyoung
  • Kim, Semin

Abstract

We consider a constitution as a pair of voting rules (f,F) in which the given rule f is for the decision on the final outcome, and the base rule F is for the decision on the change of a voting rule. Which constitutions would stably survive? We define the concepts of interim/ex-post stability, whereby agents' preferences over the outcomes are privately/publicly known when they change a voting rule. We fully characterize the set of interim stable constitutions, which consist of anonymous voting rules. Furthermore, we show that it is equivalent to the set of ex-post stable constitutions. We compare the characteristics of three sets of stable constitutions—ex-ante, interim, and ex-post stable constitutions—and discuss the relationship of inclusions. We also discuss the environmental independence of the concepts of stability, the alternative definition of stability, and the stability of higher-level constitutions composed of more than two voting rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin, 2023. "Stable constitutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 794-811.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:794-811
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.013
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    Cited by:

    1. Daeyoung Jeong & Semin Kim, 2024. "On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Weighted majority rules; Constitutions; Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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