Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.004
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Cited by:
- Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
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Keywords
Information design; Multiple senders; Search frictions;All these keywords.
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