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False information from near and far

Author

Listed:
  • Bravard, Christophe
  • Durieu, Jacques
  • Sarangi, Sudipta
  • Sémirat, Stéphan

Abstract

We study message credibility in social networks with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not type) of the message creator and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and demonstrate filtering by the network: the posterior beliefs of agents depend on the distance a message travels. Unbiased agents, who receive a message from a biased agent, are more likely to assign a higher credibility and transmit it further when they are further away from the source. For a given network, we compute the probability that it will always support the communication of messages by unbiased agents. Finally, we establish that under certain parameters, this probability increases when agents are uncertain about their network location.

Suggested Citation

  • Bravard, Christophe & Durieu, Jacques & Sarangi, Sudipta & Sémirat, Stéphan, 2023. "False information from near and far," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 152-174.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:137:y:2023:i:c:p:152-174
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    2. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2016. "Credibility And Strategic Learning In Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 759-786, August.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali, 2010. "Spread of (mis)information in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 194-227, November.
    4. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    5. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    6. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2016. "Credibility And Strategic Learning In Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 759-786, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Influential players; Filter; Network;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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