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Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms

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Listed:
  • Jalota, Devansh
  • Pavone, Marco
  • Qi, Qi
  • Ye, Yinyu

Abstract

The Fisher market is one of the most fundamental models for resource allocation. However, Fisher markets are less amenable for resource allocation settings when agents have additional linear constraints beyond the budget constraints of buyers and the capacity constraints of goods. Thus, in this work, we introduce a modified Fisher market, where agents may have additional linear constraints, and study the properties of the resulting equilibria. To set equilibrium prices, we introduce a budget-adjusted social optimization problem (BA-SOP), whose optimal dual variables correspond to the equilibrium prices. Since solving BA-SOP can be computationally intensive and requires centralized knowledge of all agents' utilities, we propose a new class of distributed algorithms based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) to compute equilibrium prices. Our ADMM approach has strong convergence guarantees and provides a general-purpose method for computing market equilibria for Fisher markets with homogeneous linear constraints and classical Fisher markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jalota, Devansh & Pavone, Marco & Qi, Qi & Ye, Yinyu, 2023. "Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 223-260.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:223-260
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fisher market; Market equilibrium; Resource allocation; Distributed algorithms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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