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Targeting in social networks with anonymized information

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  • Bloch, Francis
  • Shabayek, Shaden

Abstract

This paper studies optimal targeting when the planner knows the architecture of the network but not the identities of agents occupying different positions in the network. We show that the planner's ability to discriminate among agents depends on the balance between in- and out-neighborhoods in the social network. When influence is reciprocal, the knowledge of the network architecture is sufficient for the planner to implement the first-best actions. When in- and out-neighborhoods are imbalanced, pairs of players have an incentive to jointly misreport their identities. This situation arises when one agent influences all other agents, or when one agent is being influenced by all other agents. It also arises in hierarchical structures with nested neighborhoods where agents at lower tiers of the network are influenced by the same agents as agents at upper tiers who influence them.

Suggested Citation

  • Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden, 2023. "Targeting in social networks with anonymized information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 380-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:380-402
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Comola, Margherita & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2024. "Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting," IZA Discussion Papers 17315, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Margherita Comola & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting [En compétition pour l'influence dans les réseaux grâce au ciblage stratégique]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04706311, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social networks; Targeting; Privacy protection; Mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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