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Arijit Mukherjee

Not to be confused with: Arijit Mukherjee

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Luis Vasconcelos & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp551, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2018. "Optimal task assignments with loss-averse agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-26.
    2. Fahn, Matthias & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 42, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Felipe Balmaceda, 2014. "Optimal Task Assignments," Working Papers 54, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    5. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2013. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    6. Luis Vasconcelos & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp551, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    7. Alex Bryson & Babatunde Buraimo & Rob Simmons, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1019, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    8. Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023. "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    9. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "Traceability and reputation in supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 149-162.
    10. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    11. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2023. "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 619-652, May.
    12. Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-03, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    13. Jonathan Glover & Eunhee Kim, 2021. "Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5800-5820, September.
    14. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
    15. Seongwuk Moon, 2018. "Skill development, bargaining power, and a theory of job design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 270-296, June.
    16. Charlene M. Kalenkoski & Gigi Foster, 2015. "Measuring the relative productivity of multitasking to sole-tasking in household production: experimental evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(18), pages 1847-1862, April.
    17. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 693-736, December.
    18. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2018. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 18-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    19. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    20. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

Articles

  1. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 522-544, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2018. "Balance of opinions in expert panels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 151-154.
    2. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    3. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    4. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
    5. Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    6. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Ottaviani, Marco, 2022. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Sourav Bhattacharya & Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "On the Optimality of Diverse Expert Panels in Persuasion Games," Working Paper 516, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2013.
    8. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 2108, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    9. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
    10. Avi Lichtig & Ran Weksler, 2023. "Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_405, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Information disclosure with many alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(4), pages 851-873, November.
    12. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
    13. Yingni Guo, 2021. "Information transmission and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 835-868, October.
    14. Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
    15. Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-06, CIRANO.
    16. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    17. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    18. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    19. Newton Jonathan, 2014. "Cheap Talk and Editorial Control," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
    20. Karakoç Gülen, 2022. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 527-556, June.
    21. Jay Lu & Simon Board, 2015. "Information Provision and Consumer Search," 2015 Meeting Papers 1427, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2018. "Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 1811, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    23. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    24. Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2018. "When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 186-189.
    25. Paul E. Fischer & Mirko S. Heinle & Kevin C. Smith, 2020. "Constrained listening, audience alignment, and expert communication," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1037-1062, December.
    26. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
    27. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    28. MohammadAmin Fazli & Mahdi Lashkari & Hamed Taherkhani & Jafar Habibi, 2022. "A Novel Experts Advice Aggregation Framework Using Deep Reinforcement Learning for Portfolio Management," Papers 2212.14477, arXiv.org.
    29. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
    30. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    31. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2011. "Competition in Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 17436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    32. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
    33. Qiang Gong & Jie Shuai & Huanxing Yang, 2023. "Informational correlation and selective disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 645-683, August.
    34. Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2021. "Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 1-27.

  2. Arijit Mukherjee & Luís Vasconcelos, 2012. "Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 754-782, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Natarajan Balasubramanian & Jin Woo Chang & Mariko Sakakibara & Jagadeesh Sivadasan & Evan Starr, 2022. "Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(S), pages 349-396.
    2. Pedro Gonzaga & António Brandão & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Theory of Collusion in the Labor Market," FEP Working Papers 477, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    4. Diego Battiston & Miguel Espinosa & Shuo Liu, 2021. "Talent poaching and job rotation," Economics Working Papers 1768, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Picariello, Luca, 2017. "Organizational Design with Portable Skills," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 2/2017, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    6. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.
    7. Suman Ghosh & Kameshwari Shankar, 2017. "Optimal Enforcement Of Noncompete Covenants," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 305-318, January.
    8. Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2018. "A novel justification for legal restrictions on non-compete clauses," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 49-57.
    9. Pedro Gonzaga & António Brandão & Helder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Theory of Semi-Collusion in the Labor Market," FEP Working Papers 522, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

  3. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.

    Cited by:

    1. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3440, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2019. "Is there no ‘I’ in team? Strategic effects in multi-battle team competition," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    3. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 430, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2015. "The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 521-569.
    5. Ming Hu & Lu Wang, 2021. "Joint vs. Separate Crowdsourcing Contests," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2711-2728, May.
    6. Schmutzler, Armin & Klein, Arnd Heinrich, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Alex Smolin, 2021. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 300-331, November.
    8. Cédric Gutierrez & Tomasz Obloj & Douglas H. Frank, 2021. "Better to have led and lost than never to have led at all? Lost leadership and effort provision in dynamic tournaments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 774-801, April.
    9. Gwen-Jiro Clochard & Guillaume Hollard & Julia Wirtz, 2022. "More effort or better technologies? On the effect of relative performance feedback," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 22/767, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    10. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
    11. Terstiege, Stefan, 2014. "Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 341-344.
    12. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," NBER Working Papers 31036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Hans K. Hvide & Yanren Zhang, 2021. "Too big to succeed? Overstaffing in firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 784-798, November.
    14. Bo Chen & Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2022. "Information disclosure in dynamic research contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 113-137, March.
    15. Berger, Johannes & Nieken, Petra, 2010. "Heterogeneous Contestants and Effort Provision in Tournaments - an Empirical Investigation with Professional Sports Data," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 325, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    16. Daniel P. Gross, 2016. "Performance Feedback in Competitive Product Development," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-110, Harvard Business School, revised Oct 2016.
    17. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2013. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 7652, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    19. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    20. Philipp Ager & Leonardo Bursztyn & Lukas Leucht & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2022. "Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939–45," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(5), pages 2257-2292.
    21. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
    22. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    23. Jan Zabojnik, 2011. "Subjective Evaluations With Performance Feedback," Working Paper 1283, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    24. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    25. Fu, Qiang & Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Communication and commitment in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-19.
    26. Philipp Ager & Leonardo Bursztyn & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2016. "Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II," NBER Working Papers 22992, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Yildirim Mustafa, 2018. "Pre-contest Communication Incentives," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    28. Haoming Liu & Jingfeng Lu & Alberto Salvo, 2023. "Willingness to fight on: Environmental quality in dynamic contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 189-239, June.
    29. Julia Nafziger & Heiner Schumacher, 2013. "Information Management and Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 140-163, March.
    30. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
    31. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.
    32. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
    33. Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang & Yan Huang & Damian R. Beil, 2022. "The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4858-4877, July.
    34. Ján Zábojník, 2014. "Subjective evaluations with performance feedback," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 341-369, June.
    35. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
    36. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    37. Iván Marinovic, 2015. "The Credibility of Performance Feedback in Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 165-188, March.
    38. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
    39. Zeballos, Eliana, 2018. "Destructive actions and productivity: Experimental evidence on interpersonal comparisons among dairy farmers in Bolivia," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 82-94.
    40. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo.
    41. Jürgen Mihm & Jochen Schlapp, 2019. "Sourcing Innovation: On Feedback in Contests," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 559-576, February.
    42. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
    43. Brendan Daley & Ruoyu Wang, 2018. "When to Release Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 11-26, March.
    44. Marino, Anthony M. & Ozbas, Oguzhan, 2014. "Disclosure of status in an agency setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 191-207.
    45. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  4. Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 44-69, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 363-377, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012. "Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0853, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

  6. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition," Discussion Papers 2012/139, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Alex Bryson & Babatunde Buraimo & Rob Simmons, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1019, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Günter Strobl & Edward D. Van Wesep, 2013. "Publicizing Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 918-932, April.

  7. Mukherjee, Arijit & Stern, Scott, 2009. "Disclosure or secrecy? The dynamics of Open Science," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 449-462, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ozgur Aydogmus & Erkan Gürpinar, 2022. "Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1163-1188, December.
    2. Haeussler, Carolin & Jiang, Lin & Thursby, Jerry & Thursby, Marie, 2014. "Specific and general information sharing among competing academic researchers," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 465-475.
    3. KWON Seokbeom & MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki, 2020. "Incentive or Disincentive for Disclosure of Research Data? A Large-Scale Empirical Analysis and Implications for Open Science Policy," Discussion papers 20058, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    4. Toole, Andrew A. & King, John L., 2011. "Industry-science connections in agriculture: Do public science collaborations and knowledge flows contribute to firm-level agricultural research productivity?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Joshua S. Gans & Fiona E. Murray & Scott Stern, 2013. "Contracting Over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property and Academic Publication," NBER Working Papers 19560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ruben Vicente-Saez & Robin Gustafsson & Clara Martinez-Fuentes, 2021. "Opening up science for a sustainable world: An expansive normative structure of open science in the digital era [The Nature of Academic Entrepreneurship in the UK: Widening the Focus on Entrepreneu," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(6), pages 799-813.
    7. Frank Mueller-Langer & Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, 2014. "Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure," RatSWD Working Papers 239, German Data Forum (RatSWD).
    8. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Grimpe, Christoph & Toole, Andrew A., 2011. "Delay and secrecy: Does industry sponsorship jeopardize disclosure of academic research?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-009, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Patrick Andreoli-Versbach & Frank Mueller-Langer, 2013. "Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but not Practised," RatSWD Working Papers 215, German Data Forum (RatSWD).
    10. Roberto Camerani & Daniele Rotolo & Nicola Grassano, 2018. "Do Firms Publish? A Multi-Sectoral Analysis," SPRU Working Paper Series 2018-21, SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School.
    11. Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry & Gupta-Mukherjee, Swasti, 2007. "Are there real effects of licensing on academic research? A life cycle view," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 577-598, August.
    12. Rotolo, Daniele & Camerani, Roberto & Grassano, Nicola & Martin, Ben R., 2022. "Why do firms publish? A systematic literature review and a conceptual framework," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
    13. Sascha Friesike & Bastian Widenmayer & Oliver Gassmann & Thomas Schildhauer, 2015. "Opening science: towards an agenda of open science in academia and industry," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 581-601, August.
    14. Lacetera, Nicola & Zirulia, Lorenzo, 2012. "Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 550-570.
    15. Thomas Walter & Christoph Ihl & René Mauer & Malte Brettel, 2018. "Grace, gold, or glory? Exploring incentives for invention disclosure in the university context," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 1725-1759, December.
    16. Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2016. "Cutthroats or comrades: Information sharing among competing fund managers," MPRA Paper 71506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Rammer, Christian & Toole, Andrew A., 2013. "University spinoffs and the 'performance premium'," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-004, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Michaël Bikard, 2020. "Idea twins: Simultaneous discoveries as a research tool," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(8), pages 1528-1543, August.
    19. Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Quentin Plantec & Pascal Le Masson & Benoît Weil, 2022. "Nobel laurates and the role of the industry in the emergence of new scientific breakthroughs," Post-Print hal-03727378, HAL.
    21. Boudreau, Kevin J. & Lakhani, Karim R., 2015. "“Open” disclosure of innovations, incentives and follow-on reuse: Theory on processes of cumulative innovation and a field experiment in computational biology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 4-19.
    22. Vicente-Saez, Ruben & Martinez-Fuentes, Clara, 2018. "Open Science now: A systematic literature review for an integrated definition," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 428-436.
    23. Jeffrey L. Furman & Scott Stern, 2011. "Climbing atop the Shoulders of Giants: The Impact of Institutions on Cumulative Research," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1933-1963, August.
    24. Alejandra Manco, 2022. "A Landscape of Open Science Policies Research," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, December.
    25. Jong, Simcha & Slavova, Kremena, 2014. "When publications lead to products: The open science conundrum in new product development," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 645-654.
    26. Baruffaldi, Stefano & Poege, Felix, 2020. "A Firm Scientific Community: Industry Participation and Knowledge Diffusion," IZA Discussion Papers 13419, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    27. Omar Díaz & Gabriela Riquelme & Gibrán Rivera, 2021. "Sharing Research Data: An Analysis of the Interest of Social Scientists in the Context of a Mexican University," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-19, October.
    28. Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.

  8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Career Concerns, Matching, And Optimal Disclosure Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1211-1250, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Management," Economics Series Working Papers 367, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    3. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    4. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Levy, Raphaël, 2019. "Motivating employees through career paths," CEPR Discussion Papers 13828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Heski Bar‐Isaac & Clare Leaver, 2022. "Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 849-861, October.
    6. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    8. Clare Leaver & Gian Luigi Albano & University College London and ELSE, 2004. "Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 219, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Portilla, Yolanda, 2009. "Career concerns and investment maturity in mutual funds," UC3M Working papers. Economics we091106, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations," Working Papers 490, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Yasunari Tamada, 2019. "Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 1968-1978.
    14. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
    15. Gian Luigi Albano & Clare Leaver, 2005. "Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/132, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490, June.
    17. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Talent discovery and poaching under asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116044, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo.
    19. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573, September.
    20. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2012. "Firm/Employee Matching: An Industry Study of American Lawyers," NBER Working Papers 18620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The benefits of limited feedback in organizations," Economics Working Papers 1232, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    22. Günter Strobl & Edward D. Van Wesep, 2013. "Publicizing Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 918-932, April.
    23. Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
    24. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  9. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    2. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
    3. Evangelia Chalioti, 2015. "Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2020, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
    5. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    6. Wolitzky Alexander, 2012. "Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, February.
    7. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Koch Alexander K & Morgenstern Albrecht, 2010. "Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-40, March.
    9. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573, September.
    11. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.
    12. Hwang, Sun Joo, 2016. "A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), vol. 38(2), pages 87-101.
    13. Günter Strobl & Edward D. Van Wesep, 2013. "Publicizing Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 918-932, April.

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