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Pre-contest Communication Incentives

Author

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  • Yildirim Mustafa

    (İzmir Kâtip Çelebi University, Department of Economics, Balatçık Kampüsü, Çiğli, 35620,İzmir, Turkey)

Abstract

To demonstrate resolution and psychological strength, players often engage in pre-contest communication by publicly stating their desire to win an upcoming contest. Existing explanations for this phenomenon revolve around incomplete information and signaling. In this paper, I offer a complementary explanation that does not rely on signaling. Within a complete information setup, I show that players may have an incentive for pre-contest communication if, in addition to an audience (reputational) cost when the statement does not materialize, the players also incur an audience reward (credibility gain) when the statement materializes.

Suggested Citation

  • Yildirim Mustafa, 2018. "Pre-contest Communication Incentives," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:21:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0096
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Avinash Dixit, 2008. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 431-438, Springer.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    3. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    4. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contests; communication; commitment; audience cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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