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Information Disclosure with Many Alternatives

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  • Antonio Nicolò
  • Salvador BarberÃ

Abstract

We consider collective decision problems where some agents have private information about alternatives and others don't. Voting takes place under strategy-proof rules. Prior to voting, informed agents may or may not disclose their private information, thus eventually influencing the preferences of those initially uninformed. We provide general conditions on the voting rules guaranteeing that informed agents will always be induced to disclose what they know. In particular, we apply our general result to environments where agents' preferences are restricted to be single-peaked, and characterize the strategy-proof rules that ensure information disclosure in this setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Nicolò & Salvador BarberÃ, 2016. "Information Disclosure with Many Alternatives," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:904
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategy-proofness; Single-peaked preferences; voting rules; information disclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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