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Evaluation and strategic manipulation

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  • Pablo Amorós

    (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga.)

Abstract

We consider the problem of a group of experts who have to rank a set of candidates. Society's optimal choice relies on experts?honest judgments about the deserving ranking. However, experts' judgments are impossible to verify. Moreover, experts' judgments do not entirely determine their preferences. Then, experts might want to misreport their judgments if, by doing so, some ranking that they like best is selected. To solve this problem, we have to design a mechanism where the experts interact so that the socially optimal ranking is implemented. Whether this is possible depends on (1) how experts' judgments are aggregated to determine the socially optimal ranking and (2) how experts' preferences relate to their judgments. We state necessary and su¢ cient conditions on these two elements for the socially optimal ranking to be implementable in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium. Then, we study the implementability of some widely used judgment aggregation rules, including extensions of scoring and Condorcet consistent voting rules. Finally, we propose a non-trivial judgment aggregation rule that is Nash implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Amorós, 2022. "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Working Papers 2022-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2022-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; impartiality; manipulability; ranking of candidates; mechanism design; voting rules.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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