Information and Human Capital Managment
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- Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Management," Economics Series Working Papers 367, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection," Economics Series Working Papers 695, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENT-2007-10-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-NET-2007-10-27 (Network Economics)
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