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Optimal Enforcement Of Noncompete Covenants

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  • Suman Ghosh
  • Kameshwari Shankar

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  • Suman Ghosh & Kameshwari Shankar, 2017. "Optimal Enforcement Of Noncompete Covenants," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 305-318, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:1:p:305-318
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.12357
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 79-119.
    2. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2009. "The return to firm investments in human capital," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-106, January.
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    4. Mark J. Garmaise, 2011. "Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 376-425.
    5. Jarle Moen, 2005. "Is Mobility of Technical Personnel a Source of R&D Spillovers?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 81-114, January.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June.
    7. Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2004. "Does Poaching Distort Training?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162.
    8. April M. Franco & Matthew F. Mitchell, 2008. "Covenants not to Compete, Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 581-606, September.
    9. Stevens, Margaret, 2001. "Should Firms Be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 485-505, July.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 112-142, February.
    11. Jinyoung Kim & Gerald Marschke, 2005. "Labor Mobility of Scientists, Technological Diffusion, and the Firm's Patenting Decision," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 298-317, Summer.
    12. Arijit Mukherjee & Luís Vasconcelos, 2012. "Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 754-782, October.
    13. Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, 2011. "Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(3), pages 425-438, March.
    14. Matt Marx & Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, 2009. "Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(6), pages 875-889, June.
    15. Prasanna Tambe & Lorin M. Hitt, 2014. "Job Hopping, Information Technology Spillovers, and Productivity Growth," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(2), pages 338-355, February.
    16. Benson, Alan, 2013. "Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 149-159.
    17. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2013. "A Theory of Worker Turnover and Knowledge Transfer in High-Technology Industries," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(2), pages 107-129.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martins, Pedro S. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2022. "Training, Worker Mobility, and Employer Coordination," IZA Discussion Papers 15488, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Martins, Pedro S. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2023. "Employers' Associations, Worker Mobility, and Training," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1219, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2023. "Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 328-347, April.
    4. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.

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