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Information transmission and voting

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  • Yingni Guo

    (Northwestern University)

Abstract

I analyze an individual’s incentive to disclose hard evidence in the context of committee voting. A committee consists of three members: one left-leaning, one right-leaning, and the third ex ante unbiased. They decide on whether to pursue a left or right policy by majority rule. One of them has private information about the merits of the policies and can privately send verifiable messages to the others. If the informed member is unbiased, he withholds information to neutralize the other two’s votes when preferences are sufficiently diverse. If the informed member is biased, then the others can better infer his information, knowing that any information favoring his agenda will be shared. In the latter case, because more information is effectively shared, higher social welfare results.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingni Guo, 2021. "Information transmission and voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 835-868, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01191-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01191-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Qiang Gong & Jie Shuai & Huanxing Yang, 2023. "Informational correlation and selective disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 645-683, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee decision making; Voting; Verifiable disclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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