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Content
December 2007, Volume 18, Issue 4
- 287-299 Rawls’ Paradox
by Jason Brennan - 301-318 Buchanan on monetary constitutions
by Domenico D’Amico - 319-323 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Peter Boettke - 325-328 Clifford Winston, Government Failure versus Market Failure
by Bryan Caplan
September 2007, Volume 18, Issue 3
- 145-159 On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs
by Roger Congleton - 161-176 Conceptions of property rights and norms
by Derek Yonai - 177-197 Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988
by Gary Reich - 199-222 Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics
by Viktor Vanberg
June 2007, Volume 18, Issue 2
- 69-82 On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation
by Nicolas Andjiga & Daoud Badirou & Boniface Mbih - 83-97 Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union
by Jac Heckelman & John Dinan - 99-106 The European Union: confederation, federation or association of compound states?
by Charles Blankart - 107-126 Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro
by Maurizio Mistri - 127-143 Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective
by Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson
March 2007, Volume 18, Issue 1
- 1-20 Constitutional choice and European immigration policy
by Gabriele Orcalli - 21-34 The electoral college: diversification and the election process
by Chris Cain & Peter Basciano & Ellen Cain - 35-62 Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract
by Christian Cordes & Christian Schubert - 63-68 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions
by Dennis Mueller
December 2006, Volume 17, Issue 4
- 237-249 Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant
by John Considine & David Duffy - 251-276 Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms
by Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell - 277-301 Between European integration and regional autonomy: the case of Italy from an economic perspective
by Marco Montanari - 303-324 Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India
by Jaivir Singh
September 2006, Volume 17, Issue 3
- 133-163 Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade
by Carsten Herrmann-Pillath - 165-187 Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy
by Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini - 189-205 Germany and Italy: conflicting policy paradigms towards European monetary integration?
by Ivo Maes & Lucia Quaglia - 207-216 Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members
by Pierre-Guillaume Méon - 217-235 Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik
by Niclas Berggren
June 2006, Volume 17, Issue 2
- 71-85 Constitutional Interpretation: Burke and Buchanan and their 18th Century Intellectual Roots
by John Considine - 87-101 Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’
by Peter Schwarz - 103-115 The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana
by Scott Beaulier & J. Subrick - 117-132 Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan
by Jan Schnellenbach
March 2006, Volume 17, Issue 1
- 5-13 The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making
by Torsten Selck - 15-29 “Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration
by Nathan Griffith - 31-48 Reflections on the Origins of the Polis
by Carl Lyttkens - 49-61 The emergence of institutions in Hayek’s theory: two views or one?
by Stefano Fiori - 63-66 Review
by Thomas Leonard
December 2005, Volume 16, Issue 4
- 327-346 Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis
by Xavier Vanssay & Vincent Hildebrand & Zane Spindler - 347-368 Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Cindy Skach - 369-386 The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy
by J. Faíña-Medín & Antonio García-Lorenzo & Jesús López-Rodríguez - 387-395 Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition
by Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi
September 2005, Volume 16, Issue 3
- 227-247 Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms
by Luciano Andreozzi - 249-276 The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality
by Gianluca Grimalda & Lorenzo Sacconi - 277-284 Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World
by Mark Jackson - 285-311 The Common Law Character of English Charters: Spontaneous Order in the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164)
by Robert Mulligan - 313-317 Book Review: S TEVEN D. L EVITT and S TEPHEN J. D UBNER (2005) Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. New York: WilliamMorrow. 242 pp., $25.95
by Thomas Leonard
June 2005, Volume 16, Issue 2
- 93-111 Riker and Federalism
by Mikhail Filippov - 113-124 Federal Stability in Unequal Societies
by Simon Hug - 125-141 Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy
by Olga Shvetsova - 143-159 Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe
by Dawn Brancati - 161-188 Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution
by Erik Wibbels - 189-205 Federalism as a Public Good
by Jenna Bednar - 207-219 “The Myth of Ownership” Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
by Geoffrey Brennan
January 2005, Volume 16, Issue 1
- 5-30 Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government
by George Tridmas - 31-48 Postwar Reconstruction: Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics
by Tyler Cowen & Christopher Coyne - 49-69 Addressing Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutions and Agency
by Omotunde Johnson - 71-83 Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective
by George Selgin & Lawrence White
November 2004, Volume 15, Issue 4
- 315-338 Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries
by Sandra Joireman - 359-370 A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums
by Marc-Jean Martin - 371-381 Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich
by Franklin Mixon & W. Charles Sawyer & Len Treviño - 383-389 Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities
by Thomas Schwartz
December 2004, Volume 15, Issue 4
- 339-358 Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform
by Gerhard Wegner
September 2004, Volume 15, Issue 3
- 223-237 The Invisible Hand of James Madison
by David Prindle - 239-259 Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies
by Kjell Hausken & Christian W. Martin & Thomas Plümper - 261-280 The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework
by Anne Van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt - 281-304 Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History
by Jean-Michael Josselin & Alain Marciano - 305-307 Review: Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner (eds.) (2001) Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 351 pp., $39.00 (hardcover), $20.00 (paperback)
by Thomas C. Schelling
June 2004, Volume 15, Issue 2
- 127-132 An Introduction to the Status Quo
by Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 133-144 The Status of the Status Quo
by James M. Buchanan - 145-151 Can We Know the Status Quo?
by Roger L. Faith - 153-170 The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective
by Viktor J. Vanberg - 171-185 Contractarianism as Liberal Conservatism: Buchanan's Unfinished Philosophical Agenda
by Hartmut Kliemt - 187-204 On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility
by Mark S. Peacock - 205-213 Review
by Dennis C. Mueller
March 2004, Volume 15, Issue 1
- 3-25 Fiscal Constitutions
by Hans Gersbach - 27-76 The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution
by Fritz Breuss & Markus Eller - 77-88 Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy
by Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant - 89-107 Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence
by Stefano Solari
December 2003, Volume 14, Issue 4
- 263-285 Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting
by Bernhard Boockmann - 287-299 The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem
by Varouj Aivazian & Jeffrey Callen - 301-317 Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms
by Maurizio Mistri - 319-333 The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court
by Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini - 335-338 Hayek Contra Pangloss: A Rejoinder
by Douglas Whitman - 339-341 Reviews
by Tyler Cowen - 343-346 Reviews
by Steven Medema
September 2003, Volume 14, Issue 3
- 167-190 A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement
by Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria - 191-212 Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects
by Olga Shvetsova - 213-233 Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition
by Oliver Budzinski - 235-251 European Monetary Integration and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of Macroeconomic Policy Making
by Lucia Quaglia - 253-258 Review
by Robert Frank
June 2003, Volume 14, Issue 2
- 83-94 The Disunity of Unanimity
by Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi - 95-105 Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited
by Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay - 107-118 The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement
by Daniel Sutter & Lee Coppock - 119-140 Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust
by Benno Torgler - 141-154 A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO
by Gabriele Orcalli - 155-158 Review
by Roger Backhouse
March 2003, Volume 14, Issue 1
- 3-21 The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order
by Sujai Shivakumar - 23-37 Principles for a European Union's Public Debt
by Christoph Gwosć & Gregor Van Der Beek - 39-45 A Supply and Demand Exposition of a Constitutional Tax Loophole: The Case of Tariff Symmetry
by Robert Mcguire & T. Van Cott - 47-70 Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability
by Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino - 71-74 Reviews
by Thomas Leonard - 75-77 Reviews
by Hans Despain
December 2002, Volume 13, Issue 4
- 299-311 Expressive Constitutionalism
by Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 313-335 Towards a European Social Union: Impacts on Labor Markets in the Acceding Countries
by Ansgar Belke & Martin Hebler - 337-359 Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts
by Andreas Wagener - 361-379 The Evolution of the Social Contract
by Adam Gifford
September 2002, Volume 13, Issue 3
- 223-246 Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy
by Michael Wohlgemuth - 247-264 Comparative Administrative Procedure: Evidence from Northeast Asia
by Tom Ginsburg - 265-273 How Leviathan Taxes
by Klaus Beckmann & Elisabeth Lackner-Frey - 275-285 Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman
by Andy Denis - 287-290 Reviews
by Richard Adelstein - 291-292 Reviews
by Matthew Baker
June 2002, Volume 13, Issue 2
- 111-127 The Evolution of Institutions: An Agenda for Future Theoretical Research
by Geoffrey Hodgson - 129-148 The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations
by Thorbjørn Knudsen - 149-172 The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values
by Christian Sartorius - 173-195 Stone Age Minds and Group Selection – What difference do they make?
by Jack Vromen - 197-210 Subjective Diversity and Social Learning: A Cognitive Perspective for Understanding Institutional Behavior
by Salvatore Rizzello & Margherita Turvani - 211-213 Review
by Adam Gifford - 215-218 Review
by John Harrison
March 2002, Volume 13, Issue 1
- 3-24 Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other than the Countries they Serve?
by Peter Ordeshook - 25-52 On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe
by Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt - 53-72 MARKET MAKING AS STATE MAKING: Constitutions and Economic Development in Post-communist Eastern Europe
by László Bruszt - 73-87 The Demand for Constitutional Law
by Katharina Pistor - 89-105 What Belongs in a Constitution?
by Ruth Gavison
December 2001, Volume 12, Issue 4
- 291-311 Constitutional Constraints and Redistributive Activities
by Anders Bornefalk - 313-331 Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada
by Robert Erikson & Mikhail Filippov - 333-349 Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions
by Pierre Salmon - 351-370 Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?
by Bernard Steunenberg - 371-373 Scott Gordon (1999) Controlling the State: Constitutionalism From Ancient Athens To Today. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 361 pp., $59.95
by Jacob Levy - 375-378 Harry Brighouse (2000) School Choice and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 222 pp., $29.95
by William Howell
September 2001, Volume 12, Issue 3
- 193-215 On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy
by Roger Congleton - 217-236 An Entrepreneurial Perspective of Institutional Change
by Tony Yu - 237-253 On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach
by José Casas–Pardo & Juan Montoro–Pons - 255-272 A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications
by C.Y. Chu & Wen–Fang Liu - 273-275 Peter Moser (2000) The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 193 pp., $85
by Niclas Berggren - 277-279 Stefan Voigt (1999) Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 264 pp., $90
by Keith Whittington
June 2001, Volume 12, Issue 2
- 91-92 Introduction to the Symposium on Federalism
by Dennis Mueller - 93-121 Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization
by Robin Boadway - 123-140 Funding Versus Control in Intergovernmental Relations
by Clayton Gillette - 141-160 Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline
by Robert Inman - 161-172 Centralism, Federalism, and the Nature of Individual Preferences
by Dennis Mueller - 173-187 Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from South Africa
by Daniel Rubinfeld
March 2001, Volume 12, Issue 1
- 3-12 Monetary Constitution, Political-Economic Regime, and Long-Term Inflation
by Peter Bernholz - 13-29 An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action: Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good
by Stephan Kuhnert - 31-50 Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform
by Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio - 51-75 Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation
by Suri Ratnapala - 77-79 Reviews
by Giulio Gallarotti - 81-84 Reviews
by Thomas Leonard
December 2000, Volume 11, Issue 4
- 295-318 The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax
by Frank Buckley & Eric Rasmusen - 319-337 The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth
by Seth Norton - 339-352 Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon
by Leonard Wantchekon - 353-369 Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion
by Niclas Berggren - 371-374 Constitutions as Commitment or Coordination Device? Comment on C. Azariadis and V. Galasso: Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy
by Martin Kolmar - 375-375 Reply to Kolmar's Comment
by Costas Azariadis & Vincenzo Galasso
September 2000, Volume 11, Issue 3
- 215-230 Privatization, Land Reform, and Property Rights: the Mexican Experience
by Malcolm Dunn - 231-253 The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power
by José Molinero - 255-264 William Hutt and the Economics of Apartheid
by Peter Lewin - 265-279 Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis
by Martin Leschke - 281-283 Robert Jervis: System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life
by Giulio Gallarotti - 285-288 Steven G. Medema (Ed.): Coasean Economics: Lawn and Economics and the New Institutional Economics
by Thomas Leonard
June 2000, Volume 11, Issue 2
- 119-145 Latent Theoretical Convergence upon a Pluralist Conception of Economic Action: Adam Smith and Max Weber
by Milan Zafirovski - 147-163 Interest Groups, Referenda, and the Political Process: On the Efficiency of Direct Democracy
by Klaus Zimmermann & Tobias Just - 165-180 Institutions Meet Mind: The Way out of a Deadlock
by Salvatore Rizzello & Margherita Turvani - 181-198 Continuous Time Models of Collective Action and Political Change
by Arieh Gavious & Shlomo Mizrahi - 199-203 Reviews
by James Bond - 205-209 Reviews
by Todd Zywicki
March 2000, Volume 11, Issue 1
- 3-3 Editorial
by Dennis Mueller - 5-25 A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy
by Sebastiano Bavetta & Fabio Padovano - 27-39 The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View
by Charles Blankart - 41-57 Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union
by Christophe Crombez - 59-67 Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority
by Domenico Da Empoli - 69-86 From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy
by Paulo Pereira - 87-112 Globalization, Democracy, and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy? 1
by Viktor Vanberg
November 1999, Volume 10, Issue 4
- 327-338 Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union
by Roland Vaubel - 339-353 A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle
by Niclas Berggren - 355-365 Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and the Puzzle of Changing Constitutional Identity
by John Finn - 367-374 The Voice of the People
by Alan Hamlin - 375-383 On Ackerman's Justification of Irregular Constitutional Change: Is Any Vice You Get Away With a Virtue?
by Robert Higgs - 385-396 On Amending Constitutions
by Dennis Mueller - 397-404 Who are “We The People”? Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Jefferson, and the Problem of Revolutionary Reform
by Peter Onuf - 405-414 From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution
by Keith Whittington - 415-424 Constitutional Economics--Constitutional Politics
by Bruce Ackerman
October 1999, Volume 10, Issue 3
- 211-218 Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules
by James Buchanan & Yong Yoon - 219-243 Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism
by Viktor Vanberg - 245-264 Conventions and Economic Change: A Contribution toward a Theory of Political Economy
by Young Choi - 265-282 The Virtue of Installing Veto Players
by Shyh-Fang Ueng - 283-300 Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions
by Stefan Voigt
June 1999, Volume 10, Issue 2
- 119-148 Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States
by Dennis Mueller - 149-166 How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties
by Frank Vibert - 167-175 On the Constitution of a Compound Republic
by William Niskanen - 177-184 Is There an Optimal Constitution?
by João Faria - 185-197 Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life: An Empirical Analysis
by Alfredo Esposto & Peter Zaleski
March 1999, Volume 10, Issue 1
- 3-26 Party Fragmentation and Presidential Elections in Post-Communist Democracies
by Mikhail Filippov & Peter Ordeshook & Olga Shvetsova - 27-52 Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases from Russia
by Michael McFaul - 53-88 Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries
by Matthew Shugart - 89-105 The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox
by Thomas Schwartz
December 1998, Volume 9, Issue 4
- 271-288 Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation
by Emerson Niou & Peter Ordeshook - 289-301 Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”
by Israel Kirzner - 303-321 Using Psychology to Reinforce the Austrian Argument for Freedom: The Case of Loan Decisions
by Martti Vihanto - 323-333 Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology
by Daniel Sutter