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“Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration

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  • Nathan Griffith

Abstract

Existing theories of regional integration do not satisfactorily explain European legal integration. Like the bears’ porridge, one explains too much, another too little, and yet another requires unnecessary information. Constitutional economics, viewing regional integration as a process producing a constitution, is able to explain both momentum toward and resistance to legal integration in a parsimonious fashion. Further, it produces a unique analysis of the current circumstances of European legal integration, revealing that the Kompetenz–Kompetenz debate addresses the fundamental dilemma of compound republics. This also discloses that European integration has produced a novel answer to this old question. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan Griffith, 2006. "“Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 15-29, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:1:p:15-29
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-6791-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law; Integration; H10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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