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Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited

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  • Zane Spindler
  • Xavier De Vanssay

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  • Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay, 2003. "Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 95-105, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:2:p:95-105
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1023639521374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Z. Spindler, 1990. "Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 73-82, September.
    2. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
    3. Buchanan, J M, 1998. "Majoritarian Logic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 13-21, October.
    4. Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-353, June.
    5. Sobel, Russell S & Holcombe, Randall G, 2001. "The Unanimous Voting Rule Is Not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 233-242, March.
    6. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    8. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
    9. Tullock, Gordon, 1997. "Where Is the Rectangle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 149-159, April.
    10. repec:bla:kyklos:v:54:y:2001:i:2-3:p:465-72 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Z A Spindler & X de Vanssay, 2002. "Constitutions And Economic Freedom," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 70(6), pages 1135-1147, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Kenneth Godwin & Edward J. López & Barry J. Seldon, 2006. "Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent‐Seeking Games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 37-54, July.
    2. Eric Ip, 2015. "The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 307-327, September.
    3. Zane Spindler & Brian Dollery, 2007. "War as Rent-Seeking: A Public Choice Perspective on the Pacific War," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 21-40, March.
    4. Z A Spindler & X de Vanssay, 2002. "Constitutions And Economic Freedom," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 70(6), pages 1135-1147, September.
    5. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.

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    Keywords

    constitutional design; rent seeking;

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