The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009004906543
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998.
"The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,"
International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
- Ault, David E & Rutman, Gilbert L, 1979. "The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal Africa," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 163-182, April.
- Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
- Overbye, Einar, 1996. "Democracy as Insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(3-4), pages 319-345, June.
- Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, April.
- Buchanan James McGill, 1994. "Ethics and Economic Progress: Compte rendu par Thierry Sebagh," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 196-204, March.
- Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, September.
- Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
- Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, April.
- Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Uta-Maria Niederle, 2005.
"From Possession to Property: Preferences and the Role of Culture,"
Chapters, in: John Finch & Magali Orillard (ed.), Complexity and the Economy, chapter 4,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Uta-Maria Niederle, 2004. "From Possession to Property: Preferences and the Role of Culture," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2004-06, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Steinrücken, Torsten, 2003. "Die Legitimation staatlicher Aktivität durch vertragstheoretische Argumente: Anmerkungen zur Kritik an der Theorie des Gesellschaftsvertrages," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 30, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
- Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, September.
- Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Autocracy and the public: Mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships," CIW Discussion Papers 5/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
- Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Abused rebels and winning coalitions: Regime change under the pressure of rebellions," CIW Discussion Papers 1/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
- Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2015. "Inefficient predation and political transitions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 37-48.
- Peter T. Leeson & Colin Harris, 2018. "Testing rational choice theories of institutional change," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(4), pages 420-431, November.
- Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1997. "The old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1187-1203, August.
- Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2021. "Selectorate’s information and dictator’s accountability," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 524-542, September.
- Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2016. "When does the emergence of a stationary bandit lead to property insecurity?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(3), pages 335-360, August.
- Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
- Adamson, Jordan, 2020. "Political institutions, resources, and war: Theory and evidence from ancient Rome," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011.
"Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
- Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 4777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp735, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," Economics Working Papers 0053, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," Working Papers w0043, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ley, Eduardo, 2006.
"Statistical inference as a bargaining game,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 142-149, October.
- Eduardo Ley, 2001. "Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game," Econometrics 0110001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 Jan 2006.
- Mr. Eduardo Ley, 2002. "Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game," IMF Working Papers 2002/081, International Monetary Fund.
- Fuhai Hong & Dong Zhang, 2023. "Bureaucratic beliefs and law enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 357-379, September.
- Pursey Heugens & J. Oosterhout & Muel Kaptein, 2006. "Foundations and Applications for Contractualist Business Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 211-228, October.
- Hendrik Vollmer, 2013. "What kind of game is everyday interaction?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(3), pages 370-404, August.
- Laurie Bréban & Muriel Gilardone, 2019.
"A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of Public Reasoning: the Man Within for the Man Without,"
Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS
2019-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Laurie Bréban & Muriel Gilardone, 2020. "A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of public reasoning: the man within for the man without," Post-Print halshs-02495559, HAL.
- Robert Fleck & F. Hanssen, 2009. "“Rulers ruled by women”: an economic analysis of the rise and fall of women’s rights in ancient Sparta," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 221-245, July.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
- Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004.
"Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Ricard Gil, 2003. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," NBER Working Papers 10040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:3:p:231-253. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.