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Principles for a European Union's Public Debt

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  • Christoph Gwosć
  • Gregor Van Der Beek

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  • Christoph Gwosć & Gregor Van Der Beek, 2003. "Principles for a European Union's Public Debt," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 23-37, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:1:p:23-37
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1022343807758
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William A. Niskanen, 1994. "Bureaucracy And Public Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 333.
    2. Fedeli, Silvia, 1999. "Competing Bureaus and Politicians: A Compliance Approach to the Diversion of Public Funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 253-270, September.
    3. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(4), pages 909-928.
    4. Mueller, Dennis C, 1997. "Federalism and the European Union: A Constitutional Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 255-280, March.
    5. Balassone, Fabrizio & Giordano, Raffaela, 2001. "Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 327-349, March.
    6. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    8. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
    9. Neal, Larry & Barbezat, Daniel, 1998. "The Economics of the European Union and the Economies of Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195110685.
    10. William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), 2001. "The Elgar Companion to Public Choice," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 459.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eva Lajtkepová, 2016. "Differences And Similarities In The Indebtedness Of Eu Member States After Last Financial Crisis," Oeconomia Copernicana, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 7(4), pages 551-563, December.

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