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The Disunity of Unanimity

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  • Jonathan Klick
  • Francesco Parisi

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  • Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Disunity of Unanimity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 83-94, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:2:p:83-94
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1023642704536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-1176, December.
    3. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-376, October.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Harsanyi, John C., 1992. "Game and decision theoretic models in ethics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 19, pages 669-707, Elsevier.
    6. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luisa Giuriato, 2009. "Combining Autocracy and Majority Voting: The Canonical Succession Rules of the Latin Church," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mario Ferrero & Ronald Wintrobe (ed.), The Political Economy of Theocracy, chapter 6, pages 143-164, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Luisa Giuriato, 2006. "The decision-making procedures for the European Union's finances in the Constitutional debate," Working Papers in Public Economics 96, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    3. Fabbri Marco & GC Britto Diogo, 2018. "Distributive Justice, Public Policies and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the “Price of Equity”," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 1-23, November.
    4. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    5. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    6. Parisi Francesco, 2020. "Law and Economics as We Grow Younger," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-20, March.
    7. Dalibor Roháč, 2008. "The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-128, June.
    8. ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Herbert Hovenkamp, 2011. "Coasean markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 63-90, February.

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