IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v19y2008i1p35-59.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Roger Congleton

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Congleton, 2008. "America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 35-59, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:1:p:35-59
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9029-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-007-9029-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-007-9029-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    2. Schofield, Norman, 2002. "Evolution of the Constitution," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Congleton, Roger D., 2007. "From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 261-284, June.
    4. Stasavage,David, 2003. "Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521809672, November.
    5. Lutz, Donald S., 1984. "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 189-197, March.
    6. Hall, Peter A. & Taylor, Rosemary C. R., 1996. "Political science and the three new institutionalisms," MPIfG Discussion Paper 96/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. İ. Semih Akçomak & Dinand Webbink & Bas Weel, 2016. "Why Did the Netherlands Develop So Early? The Legacy of the Brethren of the Common Life," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 821-860, June.
    2. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 4, pages 47-67, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grier, Robin & Young, Andrew T. & Grier, Kevin, 2022. "The causal effects of rule of law & property rights on fiscal capacity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. Seghezza, Elena, 2015. "Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 71-81.
    4. Dan Bogart, 2016. "The East Indian Monopoly and the Transition from Limited Access in England, 1600–1813," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 23-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    6. James A. Robinson, 2006. "Equity, Institutions and the Development Process," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 32, pages 17-50.
    7. Michael Bradley & Elisabeth de Fontenay & Irving Arturo de Lira Salvatierra & Mitu Gulati, 2018. "Pricing Sovereign Debt: Foreign versus Local Parameters," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(2), pages 261-297, March.
    8. Gregory Price & Warren Whatley, 2021. "Did profitable slave trading enable the expansion of empire?: The Asiento de Negros, the South Sea Company and the financial revolution in Great Britain," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 15(3), pages 675-718, September.
    9. Sebastián Saiegh, 2013. "Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 61-75, July.
    10. World Bank, 2008. "The Political Economy of Policy Reform : Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations," World Bank Publications - Reports 7782, The World Bank Group.
    11. Kenneth W. Abbott & Philipp Genschel & Duncan Snidal & Bernhard Zangl, 2020. "Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 619-636, October.
    12. Chilosi, David, 2014. "Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 887-915, September.
    13. Timothy Besley, 2020. "State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1307-1335, July.
    14. De Magalhaes, Leandro & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2022. "War and the rise of parliaments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    15. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    16. Cox, Gary W., 2012. "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 567-600, August.
    17. Madarász, Aladár, 2011. "Buborékok és legendák. Válságok és válságmagyarázatok - II/1. rész. A Déltengeri Társaság [Bubbles and myths, crises and explanations II/1: the South Sea bubble]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 909-948.
    18. Anne Meng, 2019. "Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 568-599, October.
    19. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    20. Congleton, Roger D., 2007. "From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 261-284, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional evolution; Constitutional reform; Constitutional history; Public choice; Dutch republic; American Revolution; Glorious Revolution; D72; H11; N40; F54;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:1:p:35-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.