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Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

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  • Gary Reich

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gary Reich, 2007. "Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 177-197, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:3:p:177-197
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9020-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    2. Oliver Budzinski, 2003. "Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 213-233, September.
    3. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-550, May.
    4. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    5. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional assemblies; Coordination games; Political ideologies; Social choice; Legislative bargaining; Brazil; C72; D72; N46;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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