IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pco300.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Roger D. Congleton

Personal Details

First Name:Roger
Middle Name:D.
Last Name:Congleton
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pco300
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://rdc1.net
Terminal Degree:1974 Department of Economics; Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(1%) Economics Department
George Mason University

Fairfax, Virginia (United States)
http://economics.gmu.edu/
RePEc:edi:edgmuus (more details at EDIRC)

(98%) Department of Economics
College of Business and Economics
West Virginia University

Morgantown, West Virginia (United States)
http://www.be.wvu.edu/econ/
RePEc:edi:dewvuus (more details at EDIRC)

(1%) Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC)
Economics Department
George Mason University

Fairfax, Virginia (United States)
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/
RePEc:edi:csjgmus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books Editorship

Working papers

  1. Roger D. Congleton & Yang Zhou, 2018. "A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors," Working Papers 18-02, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  2. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus," Working Papers 18-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  3. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond," Working Papers 15-23, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  4. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  5. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Political Economy of Privacy: Information Sharing between Friends and Foes," Working Papers 15-21, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  6. Roger D. Congleton & Dongwoo Yoo, 2015. "Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis," Working Papers 15-27, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  7. Congleton, Roger D. & Yoo, Dongwoo, 2014. "A Test of the Unraveling Hypothesis: Constitutional Bargaining and the Quality of African Institutions," CEI Working Paper Series 2014-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers," Working Papers 13-04, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  9. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan," Working Papers 13-08, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  10. Congleton, Roger D., 2011. "Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?," CIW Discussion Papers 6/2011, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  11. Roger D. Congleton, 2010. "On the Evolution of Organizational Government," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2010-09, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  12. Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  13. Congleton, Roger D., 1995. "Return to Rio: Agency problems and the political economy of environmental treaties," Discussion Papers, Series II 261, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".

Articles

  1. Roger D. Congleton, 2024. "Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(1), pages 3-21, February.
  2. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
  3. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Grounding multidisciplinary public policy analysis in methodological individualism: with an illustrating study of the economic and political effects of variations in a nation’s average work ethic," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 351-383, August.
  4. Roger D. Congleton & Alex Marsella & Alexander J. Cardazzi, 2022. "Readership and citations as alternative measures of impact," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 100-114, March.
  5. Roger D. Congleton, 2022. "Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 387-404, June.
  6. Congleton, Roger D., 2020. "The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  7. Roger D. Congleton & Youngshin Kim & Alexander Marsella, 2020. "On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 101-132, April.
  8. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
  9. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Ethics and good governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 379-398, September.
  10. Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 175-198, December.
  11. Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 5-12, October.
  12. Roger D. Congleton & Yang Zhou, 2019. "A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 103-128, June.
  13. Batinti, Alberto & Congleton, Roger D., 2018. "On the codetermination of tax-financed medical R&D and healthcare expenditures: Models and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 175-188.
  14. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 229-244, June.
  15. Congleton, Roger D. & Yoo, Dongwoo, 2018. "Constitutional bargaining and the quality of contemporary African institutions: a test of the incremental reform hypothesis," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 233-258, April.
  16. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "A short history of constitutional liberalism in America," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 137-170, June.
  17. Roger D. Congleton, 2017. "Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 23-28, April.
  18. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio, 2017. "The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 483-510, November.
  19. Roger D. Congleton, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-193, June.
  20. Roger Congleton, 2015. "Thanks to Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 229-233, March.
  21. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
  22. Roger Congleton, 2013. "On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 177-198, September.
  23. Roger Congleton & Stefan Voigt, 2013. "On the editorial transition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-1, March.
  24. Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang, 2013. "Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 108-124, June.
  25. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
  26. Roger Congleton, 2012. "On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 399-423, March.
  27. Roger Congleton, 2012. "Growing up with The Calculus of Consent," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 273-278, September.
  28. Roger Congleton, 2011. "Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 187-207, October.
  29. Roger Congleton, 2010. "Dennis C. Mueller: Reason, religion, and liberal democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 585-587, December.
  30. Roger Congleton, 2010. "Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 103-105, March.
  31. Roger Congleton & Feler Bose, 2010. "The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 535-555, September.
  32. Roger Congleton, 2009. "On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 287-317, September.
  33. Congleton, Roger D. & Lee, Sanghack, 2009. "Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 102-114, March.
  34. Roger Congleton, 2008. "America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 35-59, March.
  35. Roger Congleton, 2007. "On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 145-159, September.
  36. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
  37. Congleton, Roger D., 2007. "From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 261-284, June.
  38. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 509-511, September.
  39. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 499-501, December.
  40. Roger Congleton, 2006. "The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 5-30, April.
  41. Roger Congleton, 2006. "International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 319-336, December.
  42. Roger Congleton, 2004. "Economic Development and Democracy. Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage?," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 283-314.
  43. Roger D. Congleton, 2004. "Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(4), pages 49-78, July-Augu.
  44. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
  45. Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
  46. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper)," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 145-147.
  47. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 456-476, September.
  48. Congleton, Roger D, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 35-64, April.
  49. Roger D. Congleton, 2001. "In Defense of Ignorance: On the Significance of a Neglected Form of Incomplete Information," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 391-407, Fall.
  50. Roger Congleton, 2001. "On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 193-215, September.
  51. Congleton, Roger D. & Vanberg, Viktor J., 2001. "Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-167, February.
  52. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
  53. Congleton, Roger D & Steunenberg, Bernard, 1998. "Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 287-305, June.
  54. Roger D. Congleton, 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 485-505, November.
  55. Congleton, Roger D. & Fudulu, Paul, 1996. "On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 133-136, July.
  56. Congleton, Roger D & Bennett, Randall W, 1995. "On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 1-24, July.
  57. Buchanan, James M & Congleton, Roger D, 1994. "The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 47-60, April.
  58. Vanberg, Viktor J. & Congleton, Roger D., 1992. "Rationality, Morality, and Exit," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 418-431, June.
  59. Congleton, Roger D, 1992. "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 412-421, August.
  60. Congleton, Roger D & Sweetser, Wendell, 1992. "Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 1-19, January.
  61. Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-86, February.
  62. Congleton, Roger D, 1991. "Information, Special Interests, and Single-Issue Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 39-49, February.
  63. Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "The economic role of a work ethic," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 365-385, May.
  64. Congleton, Roger D & Shughart, William F, II, 1990. "The Growth of Social Security: Electoral Push or Political Pull?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 109-132, January.
  65. Roger D. Congleton, 1989. "Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 662-672, August.
  66. Roger Congleton, 1989. "Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 101-118, August.
  67. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
  68. Roger D. Congleton, 1988. "An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan," Public Finance Review, , vol. 16(2), pages 131-157, April.
  69. Roger Congleton, 1988. "Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 181-184, February.
  70. Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
  71. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November.
  72. Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton, 1983. "Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 441-448, January.
  73. R. Congleton, 1982. "A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 421-425, January.
  74. Atesoglu, H. Sonmez & Congleton, Roger, 1982. "Economic Conditions and National Elections, Post-Sample Forecasts of the Kramer Equations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 873-875, December.
  75. James Buchanan & Roger Congleton, 1979. "Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 217-230, June.

Chapters

  1. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and tax-financed healthcare: economic advantages, dilemmas, and solutions," Chapters, in: Joan Costa-Font & Alberto Batinti & Gilberto Turati (ed.), Handbook on the Political Economy of Health Systems, chapter 5, pages 57-69, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "On Some Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock," Studies in Public Choice, in: Dwight R. Lee (ed.), Public Choice, Past and Present, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 33-42, Springer.
  3. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 4, pages 47-67, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  4. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Feler Bose & Youngshin Kim & Rinaldo Pietrantonio, 2013. "Public choice and the modern welfare state," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, chapter 22, pages 362-381, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  5. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, 2008. "Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 1-42, Springer.
  6. Roger D. Congleton, 2008. "Monitoring rent-seeking managers: advantages of diffuse ownership," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 667-677, Springer.
  7. Roger Congleton, 2008. "Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 69-95, Springer.
  8. Roger D. Congleton, 2007. "Informational Limits to Public Policy: Ignorance and the Jury Theorem," Chapters, in: José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (ed.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Roger D. Congleton, 2006. "Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  10. Roger D. Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Crisis Management: Surprise, Urgency, and Mistakes in Political Decision Making," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 183-203, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  11. Roger D. Congleton, 2001. "The politics of government growth," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  12. Roger D. Congleton, 1991. "Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 769-790, Springer.
  13. Roger D. Congleton, 1989. "Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 697-712, Springer.
  14. Roger D. Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 297-311, Springer.
  15. Roger D. Congleton, 1984. "Commitees and rent-seeking effort," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 279-291, Springer.

Books

  1. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2015. "Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15325.
  2. Congleton,Roger D., 2011. "Perfecting Parliament," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521151696, October.
  3. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 2008. "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-79182-9, January.
  4. Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2008. "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-79247-5, January.
  5. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, October.
  6. Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg (ed.), 2006. "Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033496, April.
  7. Robert D. Tollison & Roger D. Congleton (ed.), 1995. "The Economic Analysis Of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 592.

Editorship

  1. Constitutional Political Economy, Springer.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  3. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  4. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  5. Number of Journal Pages
  6. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Breadth of citations across fields

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2008-06-13 2014-08-16 2015-10-17
  2. NEP-AFR: Africa (2) 2014-08-28 2015-10-17
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2010-08-14 2014-08-16
  4. NEP-GRO: Economic Growth (2) 2014-08-28 2015-10-17
  5. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (2) 2008-06-13 2015-10-17
  6. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2011-10-09
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2010-08-14
  8. NEP-HAP: Economics of Happiness (1) 2008-06-13
  9. NEP-HME: Heterodox Microeconomics (1) 2015-10-17
  10. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-08-16
  11. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2011-10-09
  12. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2008-06-13
  13. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2008-06-13
  14. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2011-10-09
  15. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2011-10-09
  16. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2010-08-14
  17. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2015-10-17
  18. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2011-10-09

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Roger D. Congleton should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.