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A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy

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  • Sebastiano Bavetta
  • Fabio Padovano

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  • Sebastiano Bavetta & Fabio Padovano, 2000. "A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 5-25, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:1:p:5-25
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009010715599
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    2. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 673-684, May.
    4. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, September.
    5. Breton,Albert, 1998. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521646284.
    6. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    7. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2012. "A Theory of Cyclical Production of Laws and Decrees," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-09-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    2. Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino, 2003. "Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-70, March.

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