Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016629104298
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mudambi, Ram & Navarra, Pietro & Sobbrio, Giuseppe, 1999. "Changing the rules: political competition under plurality and proportionality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 547-567, September.
- Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006.
"Politics by Principle, Not Interest,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, January.
- Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 1998. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521621878, January.
- Harsanyi, John C., 1975. "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 594-606, June.
- Mueller, Dennis C & Stratmann, Thomas, 1994. "Informative and Persuasive Campaigning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 55-77, October.
- Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Che-Yuan Liang, 2017.
"Optimal inequality behind the veil of ignorance,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 431-455, October.
- Liang, Che-Yuan, 2013. "Optimal Inequality behind the Veil of Ignorance," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2013:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Liang, Che-Yuan, 2013. "Optimal Inequality behind the Veil of Ignorance," Working Paper Series 2013:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Andrej Angelovski & Arianna Galliera & Werner Güth, 2019. "Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 249-279, December.
- Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
- Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
- Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005.
"Constitutional Economics II,"
Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 13,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics," Public Economics 0508010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Dec 2005.
- Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics II," Public Economics 0508009, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Dec 2005.
- Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
- Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2020.
"Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality: Unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 341-354.
- Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2019. "Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Benefit the Worst-Off," Working Paper Series 1311, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_13 is not listed on IDEAS
- Fink, Alexander, 2012. "The effects of party campaign spending under proportional representation: Evidence from Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 574-592.
- Borella, Sara, 2005. "Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective: a hurdle-race. The case of migration politics in Germany," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 05/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2016.
"Tolerance in the United States: Does economic freedom transform racial, religious, political and sexual attitudes?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 53-70.
- Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2015. "Tolerance in the United States: Does Economic Freedom Transform Racial, Religious, Political and Sexual Attitudes?," Working Paper Series 1080, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Åsbjørn Melkevik, 2016. "No progressive taxation without discrimination? On the generality of the law in the classical liberal tradition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 418-434, December.
- Roger Congleton, 2011. "Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 187-207, October.
- Stanley L. Winer, 2016.
"The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution,"
Carleton Economic Papers
16-15, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Stanley L. Winer, 2016. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 6252, CESifo.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005.
"Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2004. "Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2004.
- Roger D. Congleton, 2022. "Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 387-404, June.
- Grzegorz Lissowski & Tadeusz Tyszka & Wlodzimierz Okrasa, 1991. "Principles of Distributive Justice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(1), pages 98-119, March.
- Russell Sobel & George Crowley, 2014. "Do intergovernmental grants create ratchets in state and local taxes?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 167-187, January.
- Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022.
"The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
- Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine & Dewitte, Edgard, 2020. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," CEPR Discussion Papers 15150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03389172, HAL.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," SciencePo Working papers hal-03389172, HAL.
- Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," Post-Print hal-03389172, HAL.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:1:p:31-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.