The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.016
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Baccelli, Jean & Hartmann, Lorenz, 2023. "The Sure-Thing Principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Sure thing principle; Agreeing to disagree; Common knowledge;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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