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Nonlinear pricing with finite information

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  • Bergemann, Dirk
  • Yeh, Edmund
  • Zhang, Jinkun

Abstract

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. We consider a multi-product environment where each buyer has preferences over a d-dimensional variety of goods. The seller is limited to offering a finite number n of d-dimensional choices. The limited menu reflects a finite communication capacity between the buyer and seller.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun, 2021. "Nonlinear pricing with finite information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 62-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:62-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun, 2021. "Nonlinear pricing with finite information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 62-84.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh, 2012. "Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000559, David K. Levine.
    6. Kristóf Madarász & Andrea Prat, 2017. "Sellers with Misspecified Models," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 790-815.
    7. Madarász, Kristóf & Prat, Andrea, 2010. "Screening with an approximate type space," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35056, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    9. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    10. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
    11. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    12. Heidrun Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Emre Ozdenoren, 2011. "Coarse matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 75-104, May.
    13. Kos, Nenad, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 233-249.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk & Haupt, Andreas & Smolin, Alex, 2021. "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers 16394, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun, 2021. "Nonlinear pricing with finite information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 62-84.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Nonlinear pricing; Multi-dimension; Multi-product; Private information; Limited information; Quantization; Information theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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