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On the value of repetition for communication games

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  • Meng, Delong

Abstract

We study repeated communication between a long-run agent and a long-run principal. In each period the agent observes the state of the world – which is i.i.d. across time – and reports to the principal. The principal takes an action based on the history of the agent's reports and public randomization signals. We allow general state space, action space, and preferences. We characterize the set of possible payoffs for the principal and the agent as the discount factor goes to one. We also study the case when the discount factor is less than (but close to) one and analyze the rate of convergence to points on the frontier of the limit payoff set.

Suggested Citation

  • Meng, Delong, 2021. "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 227-246.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:227-246
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiao Lin & Ce Liu, 2022. "Credible Persuasion," Papers 2205.03495, arXiv.org.
    2. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic mechanisms; Repeated communication; Rate of convergence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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