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Florence Naegelen

Personal Details

First Name:Florence
Middle Name:
Last Name:Naegelen
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pna228
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques (CRESE)
UFR des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, Politiques et de Gestion
Université de Franche-Comté

Besançon, France
http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/
RePEc:edi:crufcfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2020. "Pollution Permit Market and International Trade-exposed Sector: Differentiated Allocations versus Border Adjustment," Post-Print hal-02500686, HAL.
  2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Quels bénéfices peut-on attendre des réseaux de soins ?," Post-Print hal-02500715, HAL.
  3. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Medical service provider networks," Post-Print hal-01816860, HAL.
  4. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Post-Print hal-01816853, HAL.
  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Achieving a fair geographical distribution of health-care resources," Post-Print hal-01816851, HAL.
  6. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2015. "La tarification à l’activité : une réforme dénaturée du financement des hôpitaux," Post-Print hal-02500693, HAL.
  7. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "Asymmetric information and pooling contracts in the hospital sector," Post-Print hal-02500679, HAL.
  8. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2013. "Vertical Differentiation, Quality Competition and Second-Best Hospital Price Regulation," Post-Print hal-02500724, HAL.
  9. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2013. "La théorie normative de la régulation hospitalière," Post-Print hal-02500706, HAL.
  10. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2012. "Price Adjustment in the Hospital Sector : How should the NHS discriminate between providers. A Comment on Miraldo, Siciliani and Street," Post-Print hal-02500729, HAL.
  11. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2012. "Les marchés de permis d’émission : principes et évolution," Post-Print hal-02501185, HAL.
  12. Michel Mougeot & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean-Louis Rullière & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market," Post-Print halshs-00642537, HAL.
  13. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations," Post-Print hal-02500737, HAL.
  14. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Régulation et Tarification des hôpitaux," Post-Print hal-02500718, HAL.
  15. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2010. "Franchise Bidding, Regulation and Investment Costs," Post-Print hal-00448961, HAL.
  16. Florence Naegelen & Michel Mougeot, 2010. "Les marchés de droits d'émission: principes et évolution," Post-Print hal-00449442, HAL.
  17. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Outlier Payment Policy," Post-Print hal-00448965, HAL.
  18. Florence Naegelen & Anaïs Delbosc, 2009. "Enchères de quotas en phase III de l'EU ETS : l'apport des expérimentations," Post-Print hal-00448936, HAL.
  19. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Supply side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy," Post-Print hal-00448482, HAL.
  20. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Swiss DRGs: Patient heterogeneity and hospital payment," Post-Print hal-00448480, HAL.
  21. Florence Naegelen & Karine Brisset, 2008. "Enchères en ligne et E.commerce," Post-Print hal-00447956, HAL.
  22. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2007. "Was Chadwick right?," Post-Print hal-00448476, HAL.
  23. Michel MOUGEOT & Florence NAEGELEN, 2006. "Enchères anglaises inversées avec bonus de qualité dans les procédures d’E-procurement," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006032, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  24. Karine Brisset & Florence Naegelen, 2006. "Why the reserve price should not be kept secret," Post-Print hal-00448459, HAL.
  25. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Post-Print hal-00448922, HAL.
  26. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," Post-Print hal-00448920, HAL.
  27. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "La concurrence pour le marché," Post-Print hal-00448918, HAL.
  28. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Designing a market structure when firms compete for the right to serve the market," Post-Print hal-00448913, HAL.
  29. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2003. "Using Auctions for Contracting with Hospitals when quality matters," Post-Print hal-02501131, HAL.
  30. Michel Mougeot & Pierre-Henri Morand & Florence Naegelen, 2001. "UMTS : Fallait-il choisir un concours de beauté ?," Post-Print hal-02501147, HAL.
  31. Pierre-Henri Morand & Florence Naegelen, 2001. "L'attribution des licences hertziennes," Post-Print hal-01313429, HAL.
  32. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2000. "Anti-sélection, concurrence et qualité des soins," Post-Print hal-02501158, HAL.
  33. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1999. "La fonction de préférence de l'Etat : le cas de l'assurance maladie en France," Post-Print hal-02503168, HAL.
  34. Vincent Bonniol & Sandrine Chambaretaud & Olivier Chanel & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet & Laurence Hartmann & Alain Leroux & Karine Moschetti & Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1999. "Efficacité de la dépense publique en matière de santé - Cohérence des instruments de régulation - Rapport scientifique," Post-Print hal-02004982, HAL.
  35. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Théorie et application des mécanismes d’enchères," Post-Print hal-02503185, HAL.
  36. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "La régulation contractuelle de l'offre de soins," Post-Print hal-02503189, HAL.
  37. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Discriminatory Public Procurement Policy and Cost Reduction Incentives," Post-Print hal-02503175, HAL.
  38. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Faut-il interdire la discrimination dans les marchés publics ?," Post-Print hal-02503179, HAL.
  39. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Asymétrie d’information et financement des hôpitaux : une comparaison des modes d’organisation des systèmes de santé," Post-Print hal-02503183, HAL.
  40. Michel Mougeot & Philippe Benilan & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Enchères asymétriques : contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d’équilibre bayesien," Post-Print hal-02503194, HAL.
  41. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "La réglementation des hôpitaux : achat de soins ou tarification par pathologie," Post-Print hal-02503199, HAL.
  42. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Marchés publics et Théorie économique : un guide de l’acheteur," Post-Print hal-02503201, HAL.
  43. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1995. "Coûts d'entrée et intensification de la concurrence," Post-Print hal-02503209, HAL.
  44. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1994. "La discrimination par les prix," Post-Print hal-02504372, HAL.
  45. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1993. "Les marchés publics. Règles, stratégies, politiques," Post-Print hal-02504375, HAL.
  46. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1992. "Mécanismes incitatifs et formation des prix," Post-Print hal-02504376, HAL.
  47. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1992. "L'ouverture des marchés publics dans la communauté économique européenne," Post-Print hal-02503232, HAL.
  48. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1992. "Mercati Pubblici ed integrazione europea : il ruolo dei costi di entrata," Post-Print hal-02503221, HAL.
  49. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1992. "Marchés publics et intégration européenne," Post-Print hal-02504436, HAL.
  50. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1992. "Coûts irrécupérables et structures de marché endogènes : le cas des marchés régis par appel d'offres," Post-Print hal-02503234, HAL.
  51. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Duopole de Bertrand, information asymétrique et bien-être collectif," Post-Print hal-02503236, HAL.
  52. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Post-Print hal-02503659, HAL.
  53. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1990. "La libéralisation des marchés publics en 1992," Post-Print hal-02503669, HAL.
  54. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1989. "Enchère optimale, surplus collectif et discrimination," Post-Print hal-02503676, HAL.
  55. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1988. "Analyse microéconomique des marchés publics," Post-Print hal-02503706, HAL.
  56. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1984. "Les marchés hospitaliers," Post-Print hal-02504385, HAL.
  57. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1983. "La formation des prix dans les mécanismes d'enchères sous pli cacheté," Post-Print hal-02503954, HAL.
  58. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1982. "Procédures d'achats hospitaliers et comportements stratégiques," Post-Print hal-02503959, HAL.
    repec:hal:journl:hal-02501114 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:hal-02501107 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:hal-00448966 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:hal-02501120 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:hal-01313428 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:hal-00485087 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 2411-2424, November.
  2. Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson. De la théorie à la pratique des enchères," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 131(6), pages 825-847.
  3. Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-97, March.
  4. Mougeot Michel & Naegelen Florence, 2021. "Health Care Provider Networks: Are Insurers Better Off?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 187-212, December.
  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2020. "Pollution Permit Market and International Trade-Exposed Sector: Differentiated Allocations versus Border Adjustment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(3), pages 473-495.
  6. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2019. "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(2), pages 308-331.
  7. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Medical service provider networks," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(8), pages 1201-1217, August.
  8. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2018. "Achieving a fair geographical distribution of health-care resources," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 384-392.
  9. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "La tarification à l'activité : une réforme dénaturée du financement des hôpitaux," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 111-141.
  10. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and Pooling Contracts in the Hospital Sector," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 365-386.
  11. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2013. "Vertical Differentiation, Quality Competition and Second-Best Hospital Price Regulation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 109-110, pages 163-178.
  12. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2013. "La théorie normative de la régulation hospitalière," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(2), pages 179-210.
  13. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean‐Louis Rullière, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 829-856, October.
  14. Florence Naegelen & Michel Mougeot, 2011. "Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(3), pages 391-416, June.
  15. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 37-58, March.
  16. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 177-195, March.
  17. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "La phase III du système communautaire d'échange de quotas d'émission : Comment attribuer les permis ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(2), pages 165-184.
  18. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2008. "Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1196-1200, September.
  19. Karine Brisset & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Enchères en ligne et E-commerce," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 23(1), pages 165-201.
  20. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Swiss DRGs: Patient Heterogeneity and Hospital Payments," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(III), pages 309-322, September.
  21. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2007. "Was Chadwick right?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(2), pages 121-137, March.
  22. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2006. "Enchères anglaises inversées avec bonus de qualité dans les procédures d'Eprocurement," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 247-264.
  23. Brisset Karine & Naegelen Florence, 2006. "Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-19, April.
  24. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
  25. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 483-501, June.
  26. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "La concurrence pour le marché," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(6), pages 739-778.
  27. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Designing A Market Structure When Firms Compete For The Right To Serve The Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 393-416, September.
  28. Florence Naegelen, 2002. "original papers : Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 135-153.
  29. Pierre-Henri Morand & Florence Naegelen, 2001. "L'attribution des licences hertziennes," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(1), pages 215-270.
  30. Pierre-Henri Morand & Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2001. "UMTS : fallait-il choisir un concours de beauté ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 111(5), pages 669-682.
  31. Michel Mougeot & en coll°. avec Florence Naegelen, 1999. "La fonction de préférence de l'Etat. Le cas de l'assurance maladie en France," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(3), pages 361-382.
  32. Florence Naegelen, 1998. "L'attribution des marchés en fonction de l'offre économiquement la plus avantageuse," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 103-120.
  33. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(5), pages 1323-1343.
  34. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 73-82.
  35. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
  36. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Faut-il interdire la discrimination dans les marchés publics ?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 767-776.
  37. Philippe Benilan & Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d'équilibre bayésien," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 46, pages 225-251.
  38. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 207-220.
  39. Florence Naegelen, 1995. "Le placement des obligations du trésor : l'Etat doit-il discriminer ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 10(3), pages 45-79.
  40. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Duopole de Bertrand, asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(6), pages 1027-1046.
  41. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(1), pages 29-50.
  42. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1990. "La libéralisation des marchés publics en 1992," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(1), pages 52-68.
  43. Florence Naegelen, 1990. "L'arbitrage qualité-prix dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 96(5), pages 95-108.
  44. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1989. "Surplus collectif, enchère optimale et discrimination," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(5), pages 765-790.
  45. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1988. "Analyse micro-économique du Code des marchés publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(4), pages 725-752.
  46. Florence Naegelen, 1988. "L'Enchére optimale dans l'hypothése de dépendance des évaluations : une caractérisation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 10, pages 23-43.
  47. Florence Naegelen, 1986. "La malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(4), pages 605-636.
  48. Florence Naegelen, 1985. "Les marchés au cadran et la formation des prix," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 170(1), pages 46-50.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-97, March.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Chris Sampson’s journal round-up for 22nd March 2021
      by Chris Sampson in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2021-03-22 12:00:01

Working papers

  1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2015. "La tarification à l’activité : une réforme dénaturée du financement des hôpitaux," Post-Print hal-02500693, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Domin, Jean-Paul, 2015. "Réformer l’hôpital comme une entreprise. Les errements de trente ans de politique hospitalière (1983-2013)," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
    2. Dormont, Brigitte & Dottin, Alexis, 2024. "Does the opening of an emergency department influence hospital admissions? Evidence from French private hospitals," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 340(C).

  2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "Asymmetric information and pooling contracts in the hospital sector," Post-Print hal-02500679, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2020. "Regulation and altruism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 49-68, February.
    2. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2021. "The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1144-1173, December.

  3. Michel Mougeot & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean-Louis Rullière & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market," Post-Print halshs-00642537, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bizer, Kilian & Henger, Ralph & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till, 2014. "The political economy of certificates for land use in Germany: Experimental evidence," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 225, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2016. "Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale," MPRA Paper 70022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Regina Betz & Ben Greiner & Sascha Schweitzer & Stefan Seifert, 2017. "Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 351-371, October.
    4. Proeger, Till & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2017. "The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 614-624.
    5. Proeger Till & Meub Lukas & Bizer Kilian & Henger Ralph, 2017. "Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering – experimentelle Evidenz," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 80-109, April.
    6. Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting," MPRA Paper 61698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    8. Alvarez Francisco & André Francisco J., 2016. "Auctioning Emission Permits with Market Power," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-28, October.

  4. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations," Post-Print hal-02500737, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2020. "Regulation and altruism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 49-68, February.
    2. O'Brien, Thomas & Reeb, Tyler & Jaishankar, Sneha, 2018. "Changing Workforce Development Needs for Regional Transportation Planning Agencies in California," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt3kk314sx, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.
    3. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Boyer, 2013. "Welfare programs and motivation bias of social workers," 2013 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2010. "Franchise Bidding, Regulation and Investment Costs," Post-Print hal-00448961, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2016. "Sequential screening and the relationship between principal's preferences and agent's incentives," SERIES 01-2016, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2016.
    2. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "Sequential screening with privately known characteristics of cost distribution," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201502, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.

  6. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Outlier Payment Policy," Post-Print hal-00448965, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Augusto Felício, J. & Rodrigues, Ricardo, 2015. "Organizational factors and customers' motivation effect on insurance companies' performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 1622-1629.
    2. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    3. Cheung, Ka Chun & Phillip Yam, Sheung Chi & Yuen, Fei Lung & Zhang, Yiying, 2020. "Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 155-165.
    4. Yaping Wu & Yijuan Chen & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 509-524, March.
    5. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
    6. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2021. "The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1144-1173, December.

  7. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Supply side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy," Post-Print hal-00448482, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Carine Milcent, 2021. "From downcoding to upcoding: DRG based payment in hospitals," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02317416, HAL.
    2. Andrew E. Clark & Carine Milcent, 2018. "Ownership and hospital behaviour: Employment and local unemployment," Post-Print halshs-01884165, HAL.
    3. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2018. "Can Competition Reduce Quality?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(3), pages 421-447, September.
    4. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    5. Andrew E. Clark & Carine Milcent, 2015. "Hospital Employment and Local Unemployment: Evidence from French Health Reforms," PSE Working Papers halshs-01183454, HAL.
    6. Carine Milcent, 2016. "Upcoding and heterogeneity in hospitals’ response: A Natural Experiment," Working Papers halshs-01340557, HAL.
    7. Tsuyoshi Takahara, 2013. "Patient Dumping, Outlier Payments, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information," ISER Discussion Paper 0891r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2014.
    8. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2021. "The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1144-1173, December.

  8. Florence Naegelen & Karine Brisset, 2008. "Enchères en ligne et E.commerce," Post-Print hal-00447956, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Depeyrot, Jean-Noel & Duval, Marion, 2018. "‪Global Dairy Trade, plateforme électronique néo-zélandaise de commercialisation. Quelles opportunités pour les marchés mondiaux de produits laitiers ?," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 364(April-Jun).

  9. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2007. "Was Chadwick right?," Post-Print hal-00448476, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Julie de Brux & Frederic Marty, 2014. "IPPP Risks and opportunities an economic perspective," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2014-11, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    2. Nicolas Dupas & Frédéric Marty & Arnaud Voisin, 2011. "Partnership contracts, project finance and information asymmetries: from competition for the contract to competition within the contract?," Post-Print halshs-00202327, HAL.
    3. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 37-58, March.

  10. Karine Brisset & Florence Naegelen, 2006. "Why the reserve price should not be kept secret," Post-Print hal-00448459, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Yingyao & McAdams, David & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 186-193.
    2. Chen, Kong-Pin & Liu, Yu-Sheng & Yu, Ya-Ting, 2012. "The Seller's listing strategy in online auctions: evidence from eBay," MPRA Paper 38369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Edward P. Lazear, 2014. "The Impatient Salesperson and the Delegation of Pricing Authority," NBER Working Papers 20529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Kevin Hasker & Robin Sickles, 2010. "eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 3-42, August.
    5. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    6. Julie Le Gallo & Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard, 2015. "Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results," Post-Print hal-03282276, HAL.
    7. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.

  11. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Post-Print hal-00448922, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 177-195, March.
    2. Chandeni S. Gajadien & Peter J. G. Dohmen & Frank Eijkenaar & Frederik T. Schut & Erik M. Raaij & Richard Heijink, 2023. "Financial risk allocation and provider incentives in hospital–insurer contracts in The Netherlands," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 24(1), pages 125-138, February.
    3. Margit Malmmose & Karoline Mortensen & Claus Holm, 2018. "Global budgets in Maryland: early evidence on revenues, expenses, and margins in regulated and unregulated services," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 395-408, December.
    4. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    5. Isabelle Hirtzlin, 2006. "The Implementation and Pitfalls of Health Care Spending Targets in France," Working Papers hal-00942759, HAL.
    6. Ching-to Albert Ma & Henry Y. Mak, 2013. "Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    7. BARDEY, David & CANTA, Chiara & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie, 2012. "The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2441, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Carine Milcent, 2017. "Premier bilan de la T2A sur la variabilité des coûts hospitaliers," PSE Working Papers halshs-01649554, HAL.
    9. Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2014. "The "demand side" effect of price caps: uncertainty, imperfect competition, and rationing," IDEI Working Papers 815, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    10. Marisa Miraldo & Luigi Siciliani & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price Adjustment in the Hospital Sector," Working Papers 041cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    11. David Crainich & Hervé Leleu & Ana Mauleon, 2011. "Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 12(5), pages 417-427, October.
    12. Carine Milcent, 2017. "Premier bilan de la tarification à l’activité (T2A) sur la variabilité des coûts hospitaliers," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01522581, HAL.
    13. Kamhon Kan & Shu-Fen Li & Wei-Der Tsai, 2014. "The impact of global budgeting on treatment intensity and outcomes," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 311-337, December.
    14. Makoto Kakinaka & Ryuta Ray Kato, 2011. "Regulated Medical Fee Schedule of the Japanese Health Care System," Working Papers EMS_2011_13, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
    15. Elin Johanna Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir & Luigi Siciliani, 2010. "DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(10), pages 1226-1239, October.
    16. Carine Milcent, 2015. "Tarification et variabilité des coûts hospitaliers : Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde," Working Papers halshs-01202684, HAL.
    17. Isabelle Hirtzlin, 2006. "The Implementation and Pitfalls of Health Care Spending Targets in France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00942759, HAL.
    18. Luigi Siciliani & Anderson Stanciol, 2008. "Bargaining and the Provision of Health Services," Discussion Papers 08/28, Department of Economics, University of York.
    19. Bradley Chen & Victoria Y. Fan, 2015. "Strategic Provider Behavior Under Global Budget Payment with Price Adjustment in Taiwan," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(11), pages 1422-1436, November.
    20. Carine Milcent, 2014. "Coût des soins hospitaliers : effet de la concurrence par la qualité," Working Papers halshs-01010327, HAL.
    21. Oddvar Martin Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "Multitasking, quality and pay for performance," Discussion Papers 08/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
    22. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)," CEPR Discussion Papers 6689, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Isabelle Clerc & Olivier L'Haridon & Alain Paraponaris & Camelia Protopopescu & Bruno Ventelou, 2011. "Fee-for-service payment and consultation length in general practice A work-leisure trade-off model for French GPs," Post-Print hal-00711452, HAL.
    24. Pi-Fem Hsu, 2014. "Does a global budget superimposed on fee-for-service payments mitigate hospitals’ medical claims in Taiwan?," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 369-384, December.
    25. Grimm Veronika & Zöttl Gregor, 2010. "Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-34, June.
    26. Chang, Shun-Chiao & Lin, Chi-Feng & Yeh, Ta-Chun & Chang, Chun-Wei, 2019. "Determinants of the performance of traditional Chinese medicine clinics in Taiwan," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(4), pages 379-387.
    27. Boone, J. & Douven, R.C.M.H., 2014. "Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care," Discussion Paper 2014-055, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    28. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
    29. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Post-Print hal-04353272, HAL.
    30. Chang, Ray-E. & Hsieh, Chi-Jeng & Myrtle, Robert C., 2011. "The effect of outpatient dialysis global budget cap on healthcare utilization by end-stage renal disease patients," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 153-159, July.
    31. Boone, J. & Douven, R.C.M.H., 2014. "Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care," Other publications TiSEM 56362c38-f32c-45b9-93fc-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    32. Benstetter, Franz & Wambach, Achim, 2006. "The treadmill effect in a fixed budget system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 146-169, January.
    33. Joseph Squillace, 2009. "The Economics of Medicaid Dental Care: How Global Budget Methods Affect Reimbursement," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 1-20, July.
    34. Jan Boone & Rudy Douven, 2014. "Provider competition and over-utilization in health care," CPB Discussion Paper 275, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    35. Hung-pin Lai & Meng-Chi Tang, 2018. "Hospital efficiency under global budgeting: evidence from Taiwan," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 937-963, November.
    36. Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2014. "The "demand side" effect of price caps: uncertainty, imperfect competition, and ration," TSE Working Papers 14-460, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    37. Robert L. Earle & Karl Schmedders & Tymon Tatur, 2002. "Price Caps and Uncertain Demands," Discussion Papers 1340, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    38. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.

  12. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," Post-Print hal-00448920, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hoekman, Bernard & Onur Taş, Bedri Kamil, 2024. "Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    2. Long, Ngo Van & Stähler, Frank, 2009. "A contest model of liberalizing government procurements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 479-488, December.
    3. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
    4. Štěpán Veselý & Mirko Dohnal, 2012. "Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 397-406.
    5. Karl Hackenbrack & Mikhael Shor, 2012. "Auditor Preference," Working papers 2012-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

  13. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Designing a market structure when firms compete for the right to serve the market," Post-Print hal-00448913, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Gebhardt, Georg & Wambach, Achim, 2008. "Auctions to implement the efficient market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 846-859, May.
    2. van den Berg, Vincent A.C. & Rouwendal, Jan, 2016. "Tender auctions with existing operators bidding," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 1-10.
    3. Ma, Mingcao & Weng, Jin & Yu, Larry, 2015. "Market size, scale economies, and tourism market structure: A case of historic water town tourism in China," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 119-137.

  14. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2003. "Using Auctions for Contracting with Hospitals when quality matters," Post-Print hal-02501131, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Greve, 2011. "Multidimensional procurement auctions with unknown weights," Discussion Papers 11-23, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

  15. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1999. "La fonction de préférence de l'Etat : le cas de l'assurance maladie en France," Post-Print hal-02503168, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Carine Milcent & Dormont Brigitte, 2000. "Prospective payment system and costs of hospital stays [Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie - Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu]," Post-Print halshs-01990635, HAL.
    2. B. Dormont & C. Milcent, 2000. "Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie. Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu," THEMA Working Papers 2000-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. B. Dormont & C. Milcent, 2001. "Prospective Payment Systems and Hospital Heterogeneity," THEMA Working Papers 2001-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

  16. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Discriminatory Public Procurement Policy and Cost Reduction Incentives," Post-Print hal-02503175, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Susan Guthrie & James R. Hines, Jr., 2008. "U.S. Defense Contracts During the Tax Expenditure Battles of the 1980s," NBER Working Papers 14146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," Post-Print hal-00448920, HAL.
    3. Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo 19429, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA).
    4. Anirudh Shingal, 2015. "Econometric Analyses of Home Bias in Government Procurement," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 188-219, February.
    5. Evenett, Simon, 2003. "Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 4109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2012. "When to Favour Your Own group? The Threats of Costly Punishments and In-group Favouritism," Economics Series Working Papers 628, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
    8. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
    9. Zhanguang Chen & Qiaowan Wang & Chao Dou & Tian Liang, 2020. "Government Background Customers and Private Enterprise Innovation from the Perspective of Supply Chain Risk Transmission," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-22, April.
    10. Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    11. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    12. Marion, Justin, 2007. "Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1591-1624, August.
    13. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Maréchal, 2021. "Achats responsables et achat local : théorie et enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03392039, HAL.
    14. Marius BRÜLHART & Federico TRIONFETTI, 2000. "Public Expenditure and International Specialisation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 00.23, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    15. Rosa, Benjamin, 2016. "Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico," MPRA Paper 68759, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tsui, Kevin, 2003. "A "matching auction" for targets with heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 331-364, October.
    17. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
    18. Michele Santoni, 2002. "Discriminatory Procurement Policy with Cash Limits," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-45, January.
    19. Xiaoyong Cao & Jiong Gong & Guoqiang Tian, 2022. "State aid in government procurement," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(12), pages 3933-3946, December.
    20. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2008. "Favouritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural Experiment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 296-309, May.
    21. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2009. "Two's Company, Three's a Group: The impact of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism," Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers 41.2009, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2009.
    22. Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2006. "A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(24), pages 1-5.
    23. Martin Gonzalez-Rozada & Martin sola & Constantino Hevia & Fabio Spagnolo, 2012. "Estimating and Forecasting the Yield Curve Using a Markov Switching Dynamic Nelson and Siegel Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    24. MILE 02, Anirudh Shingal, 2012. "Exploring foreign market access in government procurement," Papers 305, World Trade Institute.
    25. Dimitri Mardas, 2010. "Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), Europe Agreements, and Public Procurement," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 331-343, September.
    26. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
    27. Brulhart, Marius & Trionfetti, Federico, 2004. "Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 851-881, August.
    28. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Maréchal, 2021. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts ," Post-Print hal-03418572, HAL.
    29. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 645-657, August.
    30. Branco, Fernando, 2002. "Procurement favouritism and technology adoption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-91, January.
    31. Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2012. "Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    32. Georgia Kosmopoulou & Xueqi Zhou, 2014. "Price Adjustment Policies in Procurement Contracting: An Analysis of Bidding Behavior," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 77-112, March.
    33. Klênio de Souza Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2011. "Competition for Local Public Services with Learning-by-doing and Transferability," Working Papers 06-2011, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    34. Shingal, ANIRUDH, 2011. "Foreign market access in government procurement," MPRA Paper 32814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    35. Chiara Carboni & Elisabetta Iossa & Gianpiero Mattera, 2018. "Barriers towards foreign firms in international public procurement markets: a review," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 85-107, March.
    36. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
    37. Chiara Carboni & Elisabetta Iossa & Gianpiero Mattera, 2017. "Barriers to Public Procurement: A Review and Recent Patterns in the EU," IEFE Working Papers 92, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

  17. Michel Mougeot & Philippe Benilan & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Enchères asymétriques : contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d’équilibre bayesien," Post-Print hal-02503194, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(4), pages 835-851.

  18. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Post-Print hal-02503659, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Marty, Gérard, 2020. "De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 373(July-Sept).

Articles

  1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 2411-2424, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Bardey, David & De Donder , Philippe & Zaporozhets , Vera, 2024. "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests a Literature Review," Documentos CEDE 21024, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

  2. Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-97, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Bardey, David & De Donder , Philippe & Zaporozhets , Vera, 2024. "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests a Literature Review," Documentos CEDE 21024, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Post-Print hal-04353272, HAL.

  3. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "La tarification à l'activité : une réforme dénaturée du financement des hôpitaux," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 111-141.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and Pooling Contracts in the Hospital Sector," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 365-386.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean‐Louis Rullière, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 829-856, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Florence Naegelen & Michel Mougeot, 2011. "Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(3), pages 391-416, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 37-58, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 177-195, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Augusto Felício, J. & Rodrigues, Ricardo, 2015. "Organizational factors and customers' motivation effect on insurance companies' performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 1622-1629.
    2. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    3. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2008. "Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1196-1200, September.
    4. Cheung, Ka Chun & Phillip Yam, Sheung Chi & Yuen, Fei Lung & Zhang, Yiying, 2020. "Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 155-165.
    5. Yaping Wu & Yijuan Chen & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 509-524, March.
    6. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
    7. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2021. "The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1144-1173, December.

  9. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2008. "Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1196-1200, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Karine Brisset & Florence Naegelen, 2008. "Enchères en ligne et E-commerce," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 23(1), pages 165-201.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2007. "Was Chadwick right?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(2), pages 121-137, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Brisset Karine & Naegelen Florence, 2006. "Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-19, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  13. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 483-501, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  15. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Designing A Market Structure When Firms Compete For The Right To Serve The Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 393-416, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  16. Florence Naegelen, 2002. "original papers : Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 135-153.

    Cited by:

    1. Gervasio Ciaccia & Nicola Doni & Fulvio Fontini, 2008. "Auctioning Wind Power Sites when Environmental Quality Matters," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0081, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    2. Atsushi Iimi, 2016. "Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects: Evidence from Japanese Esco Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 491-514, November.
    3. Pierangelo Mori, 2008. "Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal," Working Papers - Economics wp2008_13.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    4. Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2014. "On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-40.
    5. Goswami, Mridu Prabal & Wettstein, David, 2016. "Rational bidding in a procurement auction with subjective evaluations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 60-67.
    6. Wambach, Achim & Gretschko, Vitali, 2013. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79774, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  17. Michel Mougeot & en coll°. avec Florence Naegelen, 1999. "La fonction de préférence de l'Etat. Le cas de l'assurance maladie en France," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(3), pages 361-382.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  18. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(5), pages 1323-1343.

    Cited by:

    1. Carine Milcent & Dormont Brigitte, 2000. "Prospective payment system and costs of hospital stays [Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie - Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu]," Post-Print halshs-01990635, HAL.
    2. Martin Janíčko & Ivo Koubek, 2012. "Informační asymetrie a systém dvojího standardu ve vztahu zdravotník - pacient [Information Assymetry and Double Standard in the Doctor-Patient Relationship]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 362-379.
    3. Jana Chvalkovská & Petr Janský & Jiří Skuhrovec, 2012. "Listinné akcie na majitele a veřejné zakázky [Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 349-361.

  19. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 73-82.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Sergi, 2015. "L'histoire (faussement) naïve des modèles DSGE," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

  20. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  21. Philippe Benilan & Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d'équilibre bayésien," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 46, pages 225-251.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  22. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 207-220.

    Cited by:

    1. Carine Milcent & Dormont Brigitte, 2000. "Prospective payment system and costs of hospital stays [Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie - Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu]," Post-Print halshs-01990635, HAL.
    2. B. Dormont & C. Milcent, 2000. "Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie. Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu," THEMA Working Papers 2000-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Lise Rochaix, 1997. "Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 11-24.

  23. Florence Naegelen, 1995. "Le placement des obligations du trésor : l'Etat doit-il discriminer ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 10(3), pages 45-79.

    Cited by:

    1. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.

  24. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(1), pages 29-50.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  25. Florence Naegelen, 1990. "L'arbitrage qualité-prix dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 96(5), pages 95-108.

    Cited by:

    1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Duopole de Bertrand, asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(6), pages 1027-1046.
    2. Lionel Thomas, 2001. "Les marchés à tranches," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 437-451.

  26. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1989. "Surplus collectif, enchère optimale et discrimination," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(5), pages 765-790.

    Cited by:

    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  27. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1988. "Analyse micro-économique du Code des marchés publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(4), pages 725-752.

    Cited by:

    1. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2014. "Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence," Post-Print hal-00512813, HAL.
    2. Stéphanie Boulenger & Marcelin Joanis, 2015. "Analyse économique des marchés publics dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec," CIRANO Project Reports 2015rp-23, CIRANO.
    3. Lionel Thomas, 2001. "Les marchés à tranches," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 437-451.

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