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Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Outlier Payment Policy

Author

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  • Michel Mougeot

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Florence Naegelen

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Outlier Payment Policy," Post-Print hal-00448965, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00448965
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    Cited by:

    1. Augusto Felício, J. & Rodrigues, Ricardo, 2015. "Organizational factors and customers' motivation effect on insurance companies' performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 1622-1629.
    2. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    3. Cheung, Ka Chun & Phillip Yam, Sheung Chi & Yuen, Fei Lung & Zhang, Yiying, 2020. "Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 155-165.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5993 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Yaping Wu & Yijuan Chen & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 509-524, March.
    6. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
    7. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2021. "The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1144-1173, December.

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